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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THE LAW–MACHINE 
INTERFACE, AND FAIR USE AUTOMATION 
Peter K. Yu* 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen artificial intelligence (AI) advancing in leaps and 
bounds, capturing the attention of not only computer experts and academic 
commentators but also policymakers,1 the mass media, and the public at large.2 
In the early 2010s, IBM Watson successfully defeated two noted human 
champions in the quiz show Jeopardy!3 A few years later, Google DeepMind 
created a “Sputnik moment” in Asia4 when it beat the world’s best players in 
Go, an Asian strategy board game.5 In addition, recent research has shown the 
fast-growing improvements in the performance of artificial intelligence in poker 
games.6 Compared with quiz shows and chess games, these games have been 
 
* Copyright © 2020 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and Director, Center 
for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. This Article draws on insights gleaned from the 
Inaugural HKU Technology Law Symposium organized by the Law and Technology Centre in the Faculty 
of Law at the University of Hong Kong, the International Law Weekend 2019 at Fordham University School 
of Law, the Third Annual IP Leaders Roundtable at UIC John Marshall Law School, the FIU Law Review 
Symposium and a presentation for the Intellectual Property Law Society at Florida International University 
College of Law, the Third Annual Scholarship Retreat at Texas A&M University School of Law, the 17th 
Annual Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at Santa Clara University School of Law, and a 
faculty speaker workshop at the University of Kansas School of Law. The discussion of fair use automation 
is adapted or expanded from the remarks delivered at the FIU Law Review Symposium, which was recently 
published by the FIU Law Review. The Author is grateful to Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Daryl Lim, William 
Magnuson, Milan Markovic, and the participants of these events for their valuable comments and suggestions.  
1. For example, the Obama Administration has released a number of documents in the artificial 
intelligence area, including a strategic plan and a white paper. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY (2016); NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING 
FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE]; NAT’L 
SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIC PLAN (2016). 
2. In March 2018, The Daily Show featured a segment on robots disrupting the legal system. Ronny 
Chieng, Disrupting the Legal System with Robots, THE DAILY SHOW WITH TREVOR NOAH (Mar. 7, 2018), 
http://www.cc.com/shows/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah/cast/ronny-chieng/b27lei/disrupting-the-
legal-system-with-robots. 
3. John Markoff, Computer Wins on “Jeopardy!”: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1. 
4. See LEE KAI-FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3 
(2018) (noting that AlphaGo’s victories “turned into China’s ‘Sputnik Moment’ for artificial intelligence”); 
Paul Mozur, In Win for A.I., Google Program Humbles Master of a Mind-Boggling Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2017, 
at B3 (describing AlphaGo as “a sort of Sputnik moment” for China).  
5. See Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Machine Masters Man in Complex Game of Go, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2016, at A1 (reporting AlphaGo’s victory over eighteen-time world Go champion Lee Sedol); Mozur, 
supra note 4 (reporting AlphaGo’s victory over Ke Jie, the world’s then best Go player). 
6. See Woodrow Barfield, Towards a Law of Artificial Intelligence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2, 9 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) [hereinafter RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK] (“[A]n artificially intelligent computer designed by computer scientists beat experts in the game 
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particularly difficult because the poker players’ ability to bluff has created an 
incomplete information environment.7 
Given these amazing technological developments, it is no surprise that legal 
commentators are now actively exploring how artificial intelligence will impact 
the law.8 For instance, Eugene Volokh invited us to join him for a highly 
provocative thought experiment concerning whether society will be ready to 
accept robot judges.9 Mireille Hildebrandt questioned whether the rapid 
development of artificial intelligence and smart technologies would undermine 
or reconfigure the ends of law in a constitutional democracy.10 Tim Wu 
discussed whether artificial intelligence would “eat” the law and what the 
impending “rise of hybrid social-ordering systems” would mean for society.11 
Roger Brownsword called for greater attention to the interplay of technology 
management and legal rules and to its impact on the traditional rules of law.12 
 
of poker which required the ability to bluff and to predict whether the opponent was bluffing based on 
incomplete knowledge of the advisory’s hand.”); Carnegie Mellon University, AI Beats Professionals in Six-Player 
Poker, SCIENCEDAILY (July 11, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/07/190711141343.htm 
(“An artificial intelligence program developed by Carnegie Mellon University in collaboration with Facebook 
AI has defeated leading professionals in six-player no-limit Texas hold’em poker, the world’s most popular 
form of poker.”). 
7. As a Carnegie Mellon University press release stated: 
Games such as chess and Go have long served as milestones for AI research. In those games, all 
of the players know the status of the playing board and all of the pieces. But poker is a bigger 
challenge because it is an incomplete information game; players can’t be certain which cards are 
in play and opponents can and will bluff. That makes it both a tougher AI challenge and more 
relevant to many real-world problems involving multiple parties and missing information. 
Carnegie Mellon University, supra note 6. 
8. For discussions in this area, see generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: 
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg 
Justice” and the Risk of Technological–Legal Lock-In, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 233 (2019); Milan Markovic, Rise of 
the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325 (2019); John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: 
How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3041 (2014); Andrew C. Michaels, Artificial Intelligence, Legal Change, and Separation of Powers, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1083 (2020); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Pasquale, A Rule of Persons]; Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal 
Automation, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 26 (2015); Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing 
Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019); Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be 
Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501 (2017); Harry Surden, Machine 
Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135 (2019); 
Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
2001 (2019). 
9. Volokh, supra note 8; see also LEE, supra note 4, at 115 (noting the “Shanghai-based pilot program 
that uses data from past cases to advise judges on both evidence and sentencing”); Eric Niiler, Can AI Be a 
Fair Judge in Court? Estonia Thinks So, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/can-
ai-be-fair-judge-court-estonia-thinks-so (discussing the effort in Estonia “to design a ‘robot judge’ that could 
adjudicate small claims disputes of less than €7,000 (about $8,000)”).  
10. MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW (2015). 
11. Wu, supra note 8, at 2001. 
12. As he observed: 
To the extent that technological management coexists with legal rules, while some rules will be 
redirected, others will need to be refined and revised. Accordingly, . . . the destiny of legal rules is 
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Although all of these works carefully reminded us that we are still quite far away 
from the scenario in which machine-made decisions can provide realistic 
substitutes to human decisions, it is never too early to think more deeply about 
the complex questions arising at the intersection of artificial intelligence and the 
law. 
One area that has not received sufficient policy and scholarly attention13 
concerns the law–machine interface in a hybrid environment in which both 
humans and intelligent machines will make legal decisions at the same time.14 
Because “human-machine hybrids will [likely] be the first replacement for 
human-only legal systems,”15 developing a deeper understanding of this 
interface is badly needed. Such an understanding will also be important as 
artificial intelligence technologies continue to improve and as society becomes 
more comfortable in letting machines take over some decisions that have been 
traditionally reserved for humans.16 Indeed, society will be better off if it can 
achieve an optimal allocation of decision-making power between humans and 
machines in such a hybrid environment. Such allocation will foster what 
commentators have referred to as the “new division of labor.”17 
 
to be found somewhere in the range of redundancy, replacement, redirection, revision and 
refinement. 
ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: RE-IMAGINING THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 181 (2019). 
13. Commentators have started looking into issues in this area. See generally Crootof, supra note 8 
(discussing the benefits and side effects of hybrid human–AI judicial systems, or “cyborg justice”); Pasquale, 
A Rule of Persons, supra note 8 (explaining why complementary legal automation will play a bigger role in the 
legal profession than substitutive legal automation); Wu, supra note 8 (describing the development of hybrid 
machine–human systems as the “predictable future of legal adjudication” and exploring the prospects and 
limitations of such development). 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 150–154. 
15. Wu, supra note 8, at 2002; see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Common Law for the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence: Incremental Adjudication, Institutions, and Relational Non-Arbitrariness, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1775 
(2019) (“[T]he coevolution of human and artificial intelligence—what we could call our dance with 
machines—is well on its way to becoming routine.”). 
16. As Jason Millar and the late Ian Kerr observed: 
[W]e will rely on robots without really knowing why—simply because their algorithms provide 
the greatest number of successful outcomes. We have already seen this in Google’s search 
approach. Neither Larry [Page] nor Sergey [Brin] (nor any other Google employee) knows exactly 
why one particular web page is a better result than another. When the click patterns say it is, that’s 
good enough. No semantic or causal analysis is required. . . . Like the ancients, we will, quite 
rationally, come to rely upon them, knowing full well that we cannot necessarily explain the 
reasons for their decisions. 
Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation, Relinquishment and Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots , in ROBOT LAW 
102, 106–07 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016); see also WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: 
TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 40 (2009) (“As people come to trust the advice of a [decision 
support tool], it can become more difficult to question that advice. There is a danger . . . that [decision 
support tools] could eventually come to control the decision-making process.”); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony 
Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429, 435 (2016) [hereinafter Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving Laws] 
(“[A]s more information is generated, and the evolutionary algorithm updates and becomes a better 
forecaster, we imagine that judges will increasingly rely on the advice of the algorithm.”). 
17. FRANK LEVY & RICHARD MURNANE, THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR: HOW COMPUTERS ARE 
CREATING THE NEXT JOB MARKET (2012); see also AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE 
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In a recently published article commissioned for a symposium on artificial 
intelligence and entertainment law, I identified the pros and cons of using 
algorithms to automate fair use in U.S. copyright law and called for the 
development of an enabling environment to facilitate such automation.18 In this 
Article, I utilize the case study of fair use automation to explore how legal 
standards can be automated and what this specific case study can teach us about 
the law–machine interface. Although this Article utilizes an example generated 
from a specialized area of the law—namely, copyright or intellectual property 
law—its insights will apply to other situations involving the interplay of artificial 
intelligence and the law. As far as these applicable insights are concerned, one 
should be able to substitute the fair use standard with other legal standards, 
such as those in criminal, tort, or traffic law. 
Part I outlines the case study of fair use automation. This Part begins by 
offering a brief overview of the U.S. fair use standard and explaining why the 
automation of this standard has been chosen as an illustration. This Part then 
closely examines three dominant arguments against greater fair use automation. 
Taking seriously the benefits provided by artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, and big data analytics, Part II identifies three distinct pathways for 
legal automation: (1) the translation pathway, which converts legal mandates or 
analytical approaches into computer code and algorithms; (2) the 
approximation pathway, which ensures that machine-made decisions closely 
resemble human decisions; and (3) the self-determination pathway, which 
enables automated systems to make autonomous decisions.  
Part III explores the key questions concerning the law–machine interface, 
the understanding of which will be important when automated systems are 
being designed to implement legal standards. Specifically, these questions focus 
on the allocation of decision-making power, the hierarchy of decisions, and the 
legal effects of machine-made decisions. Part IV concludes by highlighting the 
wide-ranging ramifications of artificial intelligence for the law, the legislature, 
the bench, the bar, and academe. Holistic in scope, this Part focuses on lessons 
drawn from studying the law–machine interface. 
I. FAIR USE AUTOMATION 
Although the interplay of artificial intelligence and the law can be analyzed 
at an abstract level, it will be more instructive to utilize a concrete example that 
readers can closely examine to evaluate the potential and challenges of legal 
automation. For coherence and analytical effectiveness, this Article uses the 
automation of the U.S. fair use standard as an illustrative example throughout. 
 
SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 53–69 (2018); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 
282–85. 
18. Peter K. Yu, Can Algorithms Promote Fair Use?, 14 FIU L. REV. 329 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, Fair Use]. 
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Part I.A provides a brief overview of this standard. Part I.B explains why the 
automation of this standard has been chosen as an illustration. Part I.C explores 
the ongoing resistance toward such automation. This Subpart analyzes the three 
dominant arguments questioning the effectiveness and desirability of such 
automation and offers responses in turn. 
A. The Standard 
In the per curiam decision of Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described fair use as “the most 
troublesome in the whole law of copyright.”19 Historically, this standard can be 
traced back to the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh, a case concerning the 
unauthorized reproduction of President George Washington’s writings, official 
documents, and private letters that had been extracted from a twelve-volume 
book set.20 In that case, Justice Joseph Story drew on the traditional English 
doctrine of fair abridgement to develop the common law doctrine of fair use.21 
This doctrine was codified a century later when Congress undertook a major 
overhaul of the copyright statute in 1976.22 Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright 
Act provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.23 
 
19. 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). 
20. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
21. See id. at 345–49. For discussions of the traditional English doctrine of fair abridgement, see 
generally Joseph J. Beard, Everything Old Is New Again: Dickens to Digital, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 19, 24–26 (2004); 
Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1379–93 (2011). 
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (codifying the fair use standard). 
23. Id. 
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Although this statutory provision enumerates four non-exhaustive factors24 
that courts should consider when making fair use determinations, such 
determinations are made after the fact.25 Because these determinations require 
a case-by-case balancing of multiple factors, the legal outcomes can vary even 
for cases involving the same copyrighted work or the same amount of 
copying.26 
Thus far, commentators have widely disagreed over the expediency of the 
fair use standard.27 Its supporters have argued that this standard is clear and 
predictable. For instance, Pamela Samuelson observed: 
If one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the 
same policy cluster, it is generally possible to predict whether a use is likely to 
be fair or unfair. . . . The only clusters of fair use cases in which it is quite 
difficult to predict whether uses are likely to be fair is in the educational and 
research use clusters where judges have tended to take starkly different 
perspectives on fair use defenses in these settings . . . .28 
Commentators such as Professor Samuelson and Michael Madison also noted 
how the use of clusters could help provide the fair use regime with more clarity 
and predictability.29 By contrast, those critical of fair use took the opposite view. 
As the Australian Law Reform Commission recounted in its final report on 
copyright and the digital economy: 
 
24. See id. (using the phrase “shall include” when referring to the list of fair use factors); id. § 101 (“The 
terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ are illustrative and not limitative.”).  
25. See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 288 (2019) [hereinafter Burk, 
Algorithmic Fair Use] (“[F]air use carries with it the disadvantage of ex ante uncertainty; no one can be entirely 
certain in advance how a court will weigh the four factors, and hence there is always some apprehension that 
a use may be found infringing rather than fair.”); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for 
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 61 (2001) (“Under the current conception of fair use, 
the decision whether or not to use a work is made ex ante by the user—if an infringement suit is brought 
later, the court may or may not validate the user’s calculus, but penalties, if any, are imposed after the use has 
been undertaken.”); John S. Erickson & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dangers of Code-Based Fair 
Use Enforcement, 92 PROC. IEEE 985, 992 (2004) (“In the area of copyright law, the evolution of the doctrine 
of ‘fair use’ is tightly bound to the practice of after-the-fact adjudication.”). 
26. For example, the fair use analysis of the unauthorized use of a copyrighted song for parody is 
significantly different from that of the use of the same song for advertising. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (finding that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” may constitute fair use and remanding the case to the lower court). 
27. See generally Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy (Discussion Paper 
No 79, May 2013) 74–76 (discussing the criticism that “[f]air use would create uncertainty and expense”); 
Peter K. Yu, The Quest for a User-Friendly Copyright Regime in Hong Kong, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 283, 331–34 
(2016) [hereinafter Yu, The Quest] (discussing the debate on the fair use standard’s lack of clarity and 
precision). 
28. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2542 & n.28 (2009) 
[hereinafter Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses]. 
29. See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1525 (2004) (advancing a pattern-oriented approach to fair use decisions); Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 
supra note 28 (arguing that a focus on common patterns, or what Professor Samuelson called “policy-relevant 
clusters,” will make fair use law more coherent and predictable than many commentators have perceived). 
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The opponents of fair use have pointed to research indicating that the 
outcome of fair use cases is unpredictable. The outcome of litigation is never 
completely predictable—if it were, the parties would not have commenced 
litigation, or would likely have settled. This is also true of recent litigation over 
the fair dealing exceptions and specific exceptions.30 
Although the lack of consensus among copyright experts about the clarity 
and predictability of fair use has foreshadowed the challenge society will have 
when deploying algorithms and artificial intelligence to automate this legal 
standard, the widespread concerns about the standard’s lack of clarity and 
predictability also present an immense opportunity—If human decisionmakers 
have tremendous difficulty making fair use determinations, will intelligent 
machines do a better job? Regardless of whether these machines can perform 
better or not, the analysis in this Article will inform research on the interplay of 
artificial intelligence and the law. Such analysis will also allow us to better 
understand the importance of providing appropriate interfaces between laws 
and machines. 
B. Why Fair Use? 
For a cross-cutting project on legal automation and the law–machine 
interface, choosing an illustration that is familiar to a wide range of readers will 
be highly important. Other than this Author’s specialized expertise in the 
subject area and his past involvement in global copyright reform,31 the case 
study of fair use automation was chosen for five reasons. First, the topic is 
familiar to scholars writing in the artificial intelligence area. Many of these 
scholars already have some expertise in intellectual property law or cyberlaw. 
As a result, this case study can be easily incorporated into their analyses. In 
addition, because any analysis in the early days of legal automation is admittedly 
preliminary, using an example that is well understood by those writing in the 
area will help foster a productive scholarly dialogue in this fast-evolving area of 
the law. 
Second, the topic is familiar to not only legal scholars but also non-legal 
researchers. Whether deciding on the use of a quotation in academic research 
or the copying of an excerpt for classroom teaching, academics frequently have 
 
30. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy (Report No 122, November 
2013) 115. 
31. For the Author’s earlier works on copyright reforms, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Confuzzling 
Rhetoric Against New Copyright Exceptions, in 1 KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 278 (Peter 
Drahos et al. eds., 2015); Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18; Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be 
Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175 (2014); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants 
in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010) [hereinafter Yu, Digital Copyright Reform]; Peter K. Yu, Fair 
Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 129–37 [hereinafter Yu, Global Paradigm 
Evolution]; Yu, The Quest, supra note 27. During the last round of digital copyright reform in Hong Kong, the 
Author served as a pro bono advisor to Internet user groups and pan-Democrat legislators. Id. at 285. 
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to engage with fair use questions, at times with the help of university librarians. 
Even if these researchers do not have sufficient copyright expertise, they will 
have at least some familiarity with this area of the law. Even better, they will 
have experienced both the benefits of fair use and the potential struggle in 
drawing precise legal conclusions. Because research in the artificial intelligence 
area is highly multi- and inter-disciplinary, picking an illustration that is familiar 
to a wide range of scholars, not just those in the legal discipline, will be 
conducive to future research. 
Third, the longstanding tradition and tremendous complexity of the U.S. 
fair use standard will allow readers and researchers to see the benefits, 
drawbacks, and challenges of legal automation. Even better, this standard 
involves both statutory and case law. While the standard itself has been codified 
in Section 107 of the Copyright Act,32 its interpretations have evolved over the 
past century in common law.33 Moreover, because fair use determinations are 
made on a case-by-case basis by reference to four statutorily stipulated factors, 
the study of fair use automation will help illustrate the impact of artificial 
intelligence on the operation of rules and standards.34 Understanding this 
impact is important, in view of both the prevailing wisdom that automating 
rules are easier than standards35 and the recent literature on how legal 
automation will greatly reduce the trade-offs between legal rules and 
standards.36 
 
32. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
33. The case law on the uncodified fair use doctrine can be traced back to the 1841 case of Folsom v. 
Marsh. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
34. As the Australian Law Reform Commission declared in its final report: 
The flexibility of fair use largely comes from the fact that it is a standard, rather than a rule. This 
distinction between rules and standards is commonly drawn in legal theory. Rules are more 
specific and prescribed. Standards are more flexible and allow decisions to be made at the time 
of application, and with respect to a concrete set of facts. Further, ‘standards are often based on 
concepts that are readily accessible to non-experts’. 
 Rules and standards are, however, points on a spectrum. Rules are ‘not infinitely precise, and 
standards not infinitely vague’. The legal philosopher H L A Hart wrote that rules have ‘a core of 
certainty and a penumbra of doubt’. The distinction is nevertheless useful.  
Australian Law Reform Commission, supra note 30, at 98; see also id. at 98–100 (discussing rules and standards 
in the fair use context). 
35. As Dan Burk observed: 
[T]he ex ante indeterminacy of a legal standard such as fair use, which in the institutional operation 
of the law constitutes a benefit, presents a challenge for operational machine coding. 
Rule-oriented legal imperatives may better lend themselves to automated instructions. 
Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 292 (footnote omitted). 
36. As Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett observed: 
[T]echnological advances in predictive and communication technologies will render th[e] 
trade-off between rules and standards unnecessary. A new form of law, the microdirective, will 
emerge to provide all of the benefits of both rules and standards without the costs of either. These 
microdirectives will provide ex ante behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible 
scenario. 
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Fourth, although the case study of fair use automation utilizes a legal 
standard grounded in U.S. law, this standard has received wide and 
ever-growing international support and recognition.37 At the time of writing, 
the U.S. fair use standard has been transplanted abroad—in either identical or 
hybrid form—in a number of jurisdictions, including “Israel, Liberia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan.”38 The case 
study of fair use automation will therefore allow us to think more deeply about 
the global and cross-jurisdictional impact of legal automation. 
Finally, fair use automation is not as far-fetched as other proposals or 
thought experiments involving legal automation. In the past decade, the 
copyright industry and their supportive technology platforms have already 
actively deployed automated copyright enforcement to identify, monitor, filter, 
and monetize potentially infringing works on digital networks.39 While 
YouTube’s Content ID system provides a paradigmatic example,40 other 
platforms have deployed similar tools and algorithms to facilitate such 
enforcement.41 To the extent these platforms aim to develop automated 
 
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1403 (2017); see also 
Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, supra note 16, at 433 (discussing how the development and automatic 
updating of micro-directives will move us toward “a world of self-driving laws”). 
37. See Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 31, at 129–37 (documenting a growing trend toward 
the worldwide adoption of the U.S. fair use model and a slowly emerging paradigm evolution of international 
copyright norms); see also Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 LAWS, no. 1, art. 9, at 3–10 (2018), 
http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/7/1/9 (discussing the efforts to transplant fair use across the world and 
the eight different modalities of transplantation that the transplanting jurisdictions have employed). See 
generally JONATHAN BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333863 (listing the fair use or fair dealing provisions from around the world). 
38. Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 31, at 115. 
39. For discussions of algorithmic copyright enforcement, see generally Maayan Perel & Niva 
Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016) [hereinafter 
Perel & Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement]; Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: 
Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 189 (2017) [hereinafter Perel & Elkin-Koren, 
Black Box Tinkering]. 
40. See generally How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/ 
answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (providing an overview of YouTube’s Content ID 
system). For discussions of the Content ID system, see generally Perel & Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Copyright 
Enforcement, supra note 39, at 509–16; Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 543–60 (2017) [hereinafter Sag, Internet Safe Harbors]. 
41. As Matthew Sag observed: 
[D]espite the lack of a de jure obligation to filter under the DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act], many platforms—typically large-scale commercial enterprises—are nonetheless 
implementing automated copyright enforcement systems. At the present time, platforms using 
automated copyright enforcement include Scribid, 4shared, Dropbox, YouTube, Facebook, 
SoundCloud, Twitch, TuneCore, Tumblr, Veoh, and Vimeo. The pressure to adopt automated 
filtering comes primarily from rightsholders, but these systems also meet some of the business 
objectives of platforms. 
Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 538–39 (footnotes omitted); see also NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: 
THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES 72 (2019) (“Automated copyright detection 
systems have now been built into many other services on the internet. Facebook has developed its own 
detection systems, and companies like Audible Magic produce software that has been adopted by many 
platforms.”); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 284 (“In the area of copyright, protection of digitized 
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enforcement systems that are consistent with existing copyright law, it is 
expected that some form of fair use has already been built into these systems.42 
Moreover, a growing number of commentators have now called for greater 
algorithmic deployment to promote fair use in copyright law.43 To them, 
automation is a much-needed solution demanded by the fast pace of digital 
dissemination and the exceedingly large volume of distributed content.44 
C. Resistance Toward Automation 
At the time of writing, there have been three dominant arguments against 
greater fair use automation: (1) the relatively backward state of technology is 
unable to support satisfactory fair use automation; (2) the development of 
automated fair use systems will change creative choices and practices; and (3) 
experts have documented biases, bugs, and other problems in automated 
systems and artificial intelligence technologies, both within and outside the 
intellectual property area. This Subpart discusses and responds to each 
argument in turn in the hope of explaining why greater fair use automation is 
both urgently needed and socially beneficial. 
 
works is already increasingly mediated by algorithmic enforcement systems that are intended to effectuate the 
rights of copyright owners while simultaneously limiting the liability of content intermediaries.”).  
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (requiring “[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith 
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law”); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“A 
consideration of the applicability of the fair use doctrine simply is part of that initial review [of the potentially 
infringing material prior to sending a takedown notice as required by Section 512(c) of the Copyright Act].”).  
43. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 49, 56 (2006) (“[Digital rights management] mechanisms engineered to protect fair use rights are in 
the long-term interests of both content providers and consumers.”); Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 
UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1085 (2017) (“[T]he checks that [fair use] intends to create on the rights of authors 
must . . . be embedded in the design of online systems.”); Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 531–32 
(“[T]here is no reason in principle why matching algorithms could not be fine-tuned to identify common 
situations associated with a higher probability of fair use.”); Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-
anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 63 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention] 
(“The fact that the scope and boundaries of [fair use] are uncertain and that software code at the current state 
of technology may not be able to capture the full range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright system 
does not mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the [digital rights management] systems.”); Yu, 
Fair Use, supra note 18, at 338–50 (building the case for greater algorithmic deployment to promote fair use 
in U.S. copyright law); Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM 
Systems, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61, 63 (“[The limitation on developing a perfect mathematical model of 
fair use] should not stop us from attempting to identify a useful subset we might approximate in code.”).  
44. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1098 (“The need to address the sheer volume of copyright 
disputes requires a new approach to fair use that involves rethinking the role of legal oversight in algorithmic 
adjudication.”); Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 554 (“With over 400 hours of video being uploaded 
to YouTube every minute, it is hard to imagine that either rightsholders . . . or the platform itself . . . could 
meaningfully prevent the evisceration of online copyright without relying on automation to some extent.”); 
see also id. at 513 (“In 2016, YouTube users were uploading 400 hours of video content every minute . . . .”); 
Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-each-day-cf4bddf29f (“By 2025, 
it’s estimated that 463 exabytes of data will be created each day globally—that’s the equivalent of 212,765,957 
DVDs per day!”). 
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1. Backward State of Technology 
The first dominant argument concerns our relatively backward state of 
technology, which commentators believe is inadequate to support satisfactory 
fair use automation.45 At the turn of the millennium, when the copyright and 
technology industries, policymakers, and legal experts were exploring whether 
fair use could be built into digital rights management systems, Edward Felten 
warned us bluntly that we did not yet and might never have a “judge on a 
chip.”46 As he observed at that time: “Fair use is one of the starkest examples 
of the mismatch between what the law requires and what technology can do. 
Accurate, technological enforcement of the law of fair use is far beyond today’s 
state of the art and may well remain so permanently.”47 Writing around that 
time, Dan Burk and Julie Cohen also observed, “At least for now, there is no 
feasible way to build rights management code that approximates both the 
individual results of judicial determinations and the overall dynamism of fair 
use jurisprudence.”48 
While these scholars were right to identify the technological barriers to 
developing satisfactory automated fair use systems, it remains debatable 
whether incremental steps can be taken to build these systems.49 After all, 
 
45. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 331–33 (discussing our relatively backward state of technology as 
a major argument against the satisfactory deployment of algorithms to promote fair use).  
46. See Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 57, 58 
(“A [digital rights management] system that gets all fair use judgments right would in effect be a ‘judge on a 
chip’ predicting with high accuracy how a real judge would decide a lawsuit challenging a particular use. 
Clearly, this is infeasible with today’s technology.”); see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 59 (“At present, 
only human intelligence, reviewing the unique circumstances of a particular use, can determine whether it is 
likely to be fair.”). 
47. Felten, supra note 46, at 59; see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 192 (2019) (“Automated processes have obvious 
efficiency advantages, but such processes may not align well (or at all) with applicable legal requirements that 
are couched in shades of gray.”); Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s Windmill, 
34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7, 31 (2002) (“[T]he technologies employed by [digital rights management systems] are 
not yet sufficiently sophisticated to mirror the law of copyright because [technological protection measures] 
themselves remain incapable of distinguishing between infringing and non-infringing uses of digital works.”); 
Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110–11 (2007) 
(“Image-parsing software may someday be able to identify pictures or videos that are similar to individual 
copyrighted works, but they will never be able to determine whether those pictures are fair uses, or whether 
they are legitimate copies or displays made under one of the many statutory exceptions . . . .”). 
48. Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 56. 
49. Dan Burk and Julie Cohen expressed concern that the development of automated fair use systems 
would encourage minimalist interpretations of important safeguards and the establishment of ceilings for 
these safeguards: 
We are . . . skeptical . . . about the ability of negotiated [technical] defaults to capture the full range 
of social benefit that more flexible legal standards allow. While these defaults sometimes might 
allow access that would exceed fair use under a judicial determination, the “safe harbor” concept 
is more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair use. We suspect that copyright holders 
would be willing to concede fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would constitute 
fair use—indeed, it was just such insistence upon minimalist guidelines by rights holders that led 
to the collapse of the [Conference on Fair Use] discussions. Moreover, in the case of the 1976 
“safe harbor” guidelines for educational copying, rights holders, content users, and even courts 
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building technological systems takes time, and there will always be a 
less-than-ideal transitional period. As Microsoft software architects Barbara 
Fox and Brian LaMacchia declared in the early 2000s: 
[The limitation that no one can mathematically model fair use, as it is 
understood today,] should not stop us from attempting to identify a useful 
subset we might approximate in code. That is, we can take a purely pragmatic 
engineering approach . . . : Focus first on defining and modeling a useful 
subset of fair use rights in some policy language, then add these expressions 
to the policy evaluators of [digital rights management] systems.50 
In an article written in the mid-2000s, I also noted the need to distinguish 
between limitations and exceptions that can be interpreted by machines from 
those that cannot.51 As I explained at that time: 
The fact that the scope and boundaries of [fair use] are uncertain and that 
software code at the current state of technology may not be able to capture 
the full range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright system does not 
mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the [digital rights 
management] systems.52 
 
have shown a deplorable tendency to act as though the guidelines defined the outer limits of fair 
use. To the contrary, such guidelines were intended to delineate fair use minima: a floor rather 
than a ceiling. We are consequently reluctant to recommend an infrastructure based solely on the 
design of similar defaults into self-enforcing “lock-out” systems for fear that the “ceiling” effect 
could be even more pernicious. 
Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 57 (footnotes omitted); see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1096 (“The 
main concern is that reducing the four-factor analysis into a simplistic and somewhat rigid set of algorithmic 
instructions might cause some important aspects of fair use analysis to get lost along the way.”). 
50. Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 43, at 63. Professor Sag concurred: 
The difficulty of completely automating fair use analysis does not suggest . . . that algorithms have 
no role to play. Experience, common sense, and recent empirical research suggest that there are 
some objective characteristics that make a finding of fair use more likely, and there is no reason 
in principle why matching algorithms could not be fine-tuned to identify common situations 
associated with a higher probability of fair use. 
Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 531–32. Likewise, Timothy Armstrong observed: 
The flaw in the conclusion that [digital rights management] cannot accommodate fair use is an 
unduly hasty inductive leap from the specific (the impossibility of modeling the substance of fair 
use law in machine-administrable form) to the general (the supposed impossibility of protecting 
fair use at all in [digital rights management] systems). The foreclosure of one avenue for protecting 
fair use, however, does not imply that all avenues are likewise foreclosed, but only that design 
principles other than the creation of a perfect “judge on a chip” must be explored. 
Armstrong, supra note 43, at 88. 
51. See Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 43, at 63–73 (discussing the need for 
such a distinction); see also Deirdre Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limitations in Rights 
Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT, DRM 2002, WASHINGTON, DC, USA, NOVEMBER 18, 2002: REVISED PAPERS 137 (Joan 
Feigenbaum ed., 2002) (discussing ways and challenges to implementing copyright limitations and exceptions 
in rights expression languages, with a focus on XrML, the eXtensible Rights Markup Language); Fox & 
LaMacchia, supra note 43, at 63 (considering the importance of determining “how to create 
machine-interpretable expressions that adequately model a set (or subset) of fair use rights”).  
52. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 43, at 63. 
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Moreover, the landscape of copyright enforcement has changed 
substantially in the past decade. As noted earlier, the copyright industries and 
technology platforms have already widely deployed algorithms to facilitate 
copyright enforcement.53 If fair use is not built, or sufficiently built, into these 
algorithms—or if we do not develop what Niva Elkin-Koren has coined “fair 
use by design”54—the balance in the copyright system will shift too much 
toward the interests of copyright holders to the disadvantage of individual 
users.55 Fearing the violation of copyright law, many risk-averse users may forgo 
their socially productive creative endeavors.56 Those who constantly have to 
test the limits of copyright law may also lose respect for the law,57 viewing it 
instead as an illegitimate product of industry capture.58 
2. Changes in Creative Choices and Practices 
The second dominant argument relates to the changes in creative choices 
and practices that will be generated by the development of automated fair use 
systems.59 In a recent article, Dan Burk expressed fear that algorithmic fair use 
would create considerable biases, which in turn would affect authorial choices.60 
As he lamented: “[T]he design values embedded in automated systems become 
embedded in public behavior and consciousness. Thus, algorithmic fair use 
carries with it the very real possibility of habituating new media participants to 
its own biases and so progressively altering the fair use standard it attempts to 
 
53. See sources cited supra note 39. 
54. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1100. 
55. See id. (“Fair use by design has become a necessity in an era of algorithmic governance. The need 
to develop such tools is necessary in order to tilt the copyright balance back to its origin in our robo notice 
environment.”); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 284–85 (“[I]t may seem desirable to incorporate 
context-specific fair use metrics into copyright-policing algorithms, both to protect against automated 
overdeterrence and to inform users of their compliance with copyright law.”). 
56. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 288 (“Risk averse content users, unable to confidently 
predict the ultimate decision on their activities, may forgo some socially beneficial uses.”); Elkin-Koren, supra 
note 43, at 1100 (“The high cost and high risk involved in fair use implementation prevents users from taking 
advantage of productive uses that can foster copyright goals, simply because they fear liability.”); Yu, Fair 
Use, supra note 18, at 349 (“If automated fair use determinations can have legal effects—even if only on an 
interim basis—those determinations can enlarge the creative spaces of risk-averse users, some of whom may 
fear that their creative endeavors will violate current copyright law.”).  
57. Cf. Armstrong, supra note 43, at 109 (“Empowering users to exercise their fair use rights without 
violating the DMCA might . . . increase law-abiding behavior and temper the critical evaluation of the DMCA 
as a one-sided giveaway to powerful producer cartels.” (footnote omitted)). 
58. See generally MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: HOW CORPORATE LOBBYING 
THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS (2013) (discussing how legislative capture by the copyright industries has 
undermined online freedom); BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE 
POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 64–89 (2017) 
(discussing industry capture in the intellectual property area). 
59. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 334–35 (discussing the potential changes in creative choices and 
practices as a major argument against the satisfactory deployment of algorithms to promote fair use).  
60. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 285. 
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embody.”61 Because of the inevitable entanglement between algorithms and the 
users’ creative practices, the development of automated fair use systems will 
cause behavioral changes that will eventually generate new legal norms.62 In 
turn, the development of these new norms and practices will degrade the fair 
use standard into “an unrecognizable form.”63 Such development will also 
initiate “a self-reinforcing cycle” in which “[the] increasing use of AI 
adjudication will foster changes in values that are conducive to even greater use 
of AI adjudication.”64 
Professor Burk was right that the development of automated fair use 
systems will likely foster changes in creative choices and practices, and his 
observation was well supported by the behavioral changes we have already seen 
among those Internet and social media users who manipulated or circumvented 
the algorithms deployed by copyright holders and technology platforms.65 
However, behavioral changes are inevitable whenever decisions are made. As I 
noted in a recent symposium, “The key question about automated fair use 
systems is . . . not whether these systems will make decisions, but whether they 
will make worse decisions, or make worse decisions more frequently.”66 If 
machine-made decisions are just as good as those made by human 
decisionmakers, such as judges or law enforcement personnel, the public will 
find machine-made decisions less problematic even if they are to induce 
changes in user behavior. 
Moreover, there is hitherto insufficient evidence to show whether 
automated decisions will help creators more than they will hurt them. For 
risk-averse creators, having low-cost fair use determinations in real time will 
 
61. Id. 
62. See Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON 
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 183 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014) (discussing 
the entanglement between algorithms and social practices). 
63. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 306 (“[A]ttempting to incorporate fair use into 
enforcement algorithms threatens to degrade the exception into an unrecognizable form. Worse yet, social 
internalization of a bowdlerized version of fair use deployed in algorithmic format is likely to become the 
new legal and social norm.”). 
64. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 247; see also id. at 249–52 (discussing how AI-driven 
developments will affect the ways humans interact with and relate to the law and the judiciary). 
65. See Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2018) 
(listing avoidance, altered conduct, altered input, and obfuscation among the dominant gaming strategies 
deployed by users on Internet platforms); Caleb Garling, Tricking Facebook’s Algorithm, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/tricking-facebooks-algorithm/375801 
(discussing the experience of tricking Facebook to elevate the author’s post); Anjana Susarla, The New Digital 
Divide Is Between People Who Opt Out of Algorithms and People Who Don’t, CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019, 6:54 
AM), https://theconversation.com/the-new-digital-divide-is-between-people-who-opt-out-of-algorithms-
and-people-who-dont-114719 (“A study of Facebook usage found that when participants were made aware 
of Facebook’s algorithm for curating news feeds, about 83% of participants modified their behavior to try to 
take advantage of the algorithm, while around 10% decreased their usage of Facebook.”); Tony Zhou, 
Postmortem: Every Frame a Painting, MEDIUM (Dec. 2, 2017), https://medium.com/@tonyszhou/postmortem-
1b338537fabc, quoted in Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 303 (explaining how the author and his 
partner edited around YouTube’s Content ID system by making trial-and-error adjustments). 
66. Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 354. 
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likely be highly beneficial.67 Because the U.S. fair use system requires courts to 
make determinations ex post, those users who do not have sufficient economic 
resources to hire copyright lawyers to test the law’s boundaries may choose not 
to make socially productive use of copyrighted works in the first place.68 By 
providing a helpful safe harbor, greater fair use automation can provide 
important benefits to creators—and, by extension, society. 
3. Technological Shortcomings 
The third dominant argument pertains to the biases, bugs, and other 
documented problems now found in automated systems and artificial 
intelligence technologies.69 The technological problems in this area are not 
limited to fair use automation; they have been widely documented outside the 
intellectual property area. For instance, ProPublica published a widely praised 
exposé on the racial biases found in COMPAS, the scoring software used by 
law enforcement and correction personnel to determine risks of recidivism.70 
As the investigatory report stated, “black defendants were far more likely than 
white defendants to be incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism, 
while white defendants were more likely than black defendants to be incorrectly 
flagged as low risk.”71 In addition, the media provided wide coverage of how 
Microsoft’s Twitter bot Tay had quickly become sexist and racist because its 
“algorithms . . . had [the bot] ‘learning’ how to respond to others based on what 
was tweeted at it.”72 Another report stated that Hewlett-Packard’s facial 
recognition technology had failed to properly recognize African-Americans 
 
67. See id. (discussing the benefits of automated systems in providing low-cost fair use determinations); 
see also Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 289 (“Automated identification and removal, whether 
accurate or mistaken, is relatively cheap, whereas legal and institutional engagement is comparatively 
expensive.”); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1147 (“Realistically, the only way we are likely to sharply increase access 
to expensive services, such as lawyering, is through technology.”).  
68. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (“[F]air use in America simply means the 
right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”). 
69. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 335–38 (discussing technological shortcomings as a major 
argument against the satisfactory deployment of algorithms to promote fair use); see also ANDREW MCAFEE 
& ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM, CROWD: HARNESSING OUR DIGITAL FUTURE 53 (2017) 
(noting the “biases and bugs” in intelligent machines); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 285 (listing 
“ersatz objectivity, diminished decisional transparency, and design biases” among the inherent pitfalls in 
reliance on algorithmic regulation); Peter K. Yu, The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence, 72 FLA. L. REV. 331, 354–61 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, Algorithmic Divide] (discussing algorithmic 
discrimination and distortion). 
70. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. COMPAS stands 
for “Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions.” Id. 
71. Id. 
72. LEE RAINIE & JANNA ANDERSON, CODE-DEPENDENT: PROS AND CONS OF THE ALGORITHM 
AGE 2 (2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithm-
age. 
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because the “[c]ameras on [its] new . . . computers did not track the faces of 
Black people in some common lighting conditions.”73 
Even worse, commentators have shown that automated systems will 
“disproportionately affect groups that are already disadvantaged by factors such 
as race, gender and socio-economic background.”74 When learning 
algorithms—or so-called “learners”75—are deployed, the harm to these 
disadvantaged groups could be even greater, considering that the problematic 
algorithmic outcomes will be fed back into the automated systems as training 
data. Such repeated use of data will create self-reinforcing feedback loops that 
amplify the biases found in the initial algorithms or training data.76 Until these 
biases are corrected, the initial biases will be greatly magnified.77 
As we build automated fair use systems and make the needed adjustments 
to improve them, having problems in the transitional period is inevitable. The 
fact that we have problems in the current iterations of the automated systems 
does not mean that we should refrain from using these systems in the first place. 
It only means that we have to be careful about such usage, be active in 
 
73. Christian Sandvig et al., When the Algorithm Itself Is a Racist: Diagnosing Ethical Harm in the Basic 
Components of Software, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 4972, 4973 (2016) (citations omitted). 
74. Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, NATURE (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nature.com/news/there-is-a-blind-spot-in-ai-research-1.20805; see also VIRGINIA EUBANKS, 
AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 12 (2017) 
(lamenting how “[a]utomated decision-making shatters the social safety net, criminalizes the poor, intensifies 
discrimination, and compromises our deepest national values”); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH 
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 8 (2016) (noting 
that algorithm-driven automated systems “tend to punish the poor  . . . because they are engineered to 
evaluate large numbers of people”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 63–65 (surveying views on 
whether the disadvantaged will lag behind even further in this algorithmic age). See generally SAFIYA UMOJA 
NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018) (discussing 
how search engines promote racism and sexism). 
75. See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE 
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 6 (2015) (“Learning algorithms—also known as 
learners—are algorithms that make other algorithms. With machine learning, computers write their own 
programs, so we don’t have to.”). 
76. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed: 
[T]here is a strong risk that AI may reiterate and even amplify the biases and flaws in datasets, 
even when these are unknown to humans. In this sense, AI has a self-reinforcing nature, due to 
the fact that the machine’s outputs will be used as data for future algorithmic operations. 
Ronald Yu & Gabriele Spina Alì, What’s Inside the Black Box? AI Challenges for Lawyers and Researchers, 19 LEGAL 
INFO. MGMT. 2, 4 (2019) (footnote omitted); see also Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 
27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 827 (2017) (noting that “algorithmic self-reinforcing 
loops are now present across many spheres of our daily life (e.g., retail contexts, career contexts, credit 
decisions, insurance, Google search results, news feeds)”); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of 
Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 69 (2019) (“Bad data . . . can perpetuate inequalities through 
machine learning, leading to a feedback loop that replicates existing forms of bias, potentially impacting 
minorities as a result.”); Digital Decisions, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://cdt.org/files/2018/09/ 
Digital-Decisions-Library-Printer-Friendly-as-of-20180927.pdf (“Unreliable or unfair decisions that go 
unchallenged can contribute to bad feedback loops, which can make algorithms even more likely to 
marginalize vulnerable populations.”). 
77. See Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 359 (“As time passes, the biases generated through these 
loops will become much worse than the biases found in the original algorithmic designs or the initial training 
data.”). 
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undertaking cost-benefit analyses, and be ready to provide updates or 
corrections when problems arise.78 
For example, in view of the problems found in automated systems and 
artificial intelligence technologies, commentators have called for efforts to 
make algorithmic designs more transparent by requiring audits79 or regulatory 
oversight.80 Such transparency is badly needed considering that the algorithms 
involved are often locked in so-called “black box” systems.81 Commentators 
have also noted the importance of human intervention.82 Even though 
 
78. See BROWNSWORD, supra note 12, at 297 (calling for “the regulatory framework [to] provide for the 
correction of the malfunction” in the technology); Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 379–80 (calling for 
the development of a “notice and correct” mechanism to address problems generated by automated systems). 
79. As the Center for Democracy and Technology noted: 
Audits are one method to provide explanations and redress without compromising the intellectual 
property behind the business model. Designing algorithmic systems that can be easily audited 
increases accountability and provides a framework to standardize best practices across industries. 
While explanations can help individuals understand algorithmic decision making, audits are 
necessary for systemic and long-term detection of unfair outcomes. They also make it possible to 
fix problems when they arise. 
Digital Decisions, supra note 76; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms 
and the Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 37–42 (2017) (discussing ways to test and evaluate algorithms); Pauline 
T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017) (discussing the use of 
audits as a check against discrimination); Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 380–82 (discussing the need 
for algorithmic audits). 
80. See Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 380 (discussing the need for institutional oversight); see 
also INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, ETHICALLY ALIGNED DESIGN: A VISION FOR PRIORITIZING HUMAN 
WELL-BEING WITH AUTONOMOUS AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 70 (2017) (“An independent, internationally 
coordinated body . . . should be formed to oversee whether [autonomous and intelligent systems] actually 
meet ethical criteria, both when . . . deployed, and considering their evolution after deployment and 
interaction with other products.”); Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 247 (2011) (“[P]erhaps a trusted advisory committee within the Federal 
Trade Commission could help courts and agencies adjudicate coming controversies over search engine 
practices.”). 
81. See EUBANKS, supra note 74, at 5 (“[T]hat’s the thing about being targeted by an algorithm: you get 
a sense of a pattern in the digital noise, an electronic eye turned toward you, but you can’t put your finger on 
exactly what’s amiss.”); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015) (“[W]orkings [in black box systems] are mysterious; we can 
observe [their] inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, 
supra note 72, at 19 (“There is a larger problem with the increase of algorithm-based outcomes beyond the 
risk of error or discrimination—the increasing opacity of decision-making and the growing lack of human 
accountability.” (quoting Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Cen ter)). For 
book-length treatments of the problems generated by “black box” algorithms, see generally EUBANKS, supra 
note 74; O’NEIL, supra note 74; PASQUALE, supra. 
82. Professors Casey and Niblett, for example, noted the continuous role of humans in algorithmic 
development: 
Algorithmic decision-making does not mean that humans are shut out of the process. Even after 
the objective has been set, there is much human work to be done. Indeed, humans are involved 
in all stages of setting up, training, coding, and assessing the merits of the algorithm. If the 
objectives of the algorithm and the objective of the law are perfectly aligned at the ex ante stage, 
one must ask: Under what circumstances should a human ignore the algorithm’s suggestions and 
intervene after the algorithm has made the decision? 
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 
354 (2019) [hereinafter Casey & Niblett, A Framework]; see also Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22(3), 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 (requiring data controllers to “implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
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Professors Burk and Cohen were skeptical of the successful development of 
automated fair use systems, they advanced a proposal calling for “the 
introduction of an external [human] decisionmaker into the process for 
obtaining access to technologically secured works.”83 In a proposal advanced 
more than a decade ago, I also advocated the “technology first, courts later” 
approach to enable courts to step in to provide the needed human 
intervention.84 
4. Summary 
In sum, the development of automated fair use systems is still fraught with 
problems. Nevertheless, remedies do exist to address some of these problems. 
Moreover, technology will continue to improve. Compared with the turn of this 
century when commentators were actively debating whether fair use could be 
built into digital rights management systems, the technology and data that have 
become available today to build automated fair use systems are already very 
different. As Professor Elkin-Koren reminded us: 
Overall, th[e] concerns regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use 
overlook recent developments in Artificial Intelligence . . . and machine 
learning capabilities. AI has already been applied in very sophisticated 
contexts: physicians use algorithms to guide their diagnoses; banks use them 
to decide when to approve a loan; security agencies use AI to identify risks; 
lawyers use them to perform due diligence; and even courts rely on algorithms 
for sentencing, by scoring the risk of the offender committing future crimes. 
AI has already been applied for decision-making processes in contexts that are 
 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest [a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling]”); Peter K. Yu, Beyond Transparency and Accountability: Three Additional Features Algorithm 
Designers Should Build into Intelligent Platforms, 13 NE. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (calling on technology 
platforms to build intervenability into algorithmic designs and operations). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, A Right 
to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 611 (2020) (discussing whether individuals have a “right to a human 
decision”); Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer Automation and 
Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216 (2017) (tracing the historical roots of “[t]he right to a human in the loop” 
back to rights that protect the dignity of data subjects). 
83. Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 59; see also Armstrong, supra note 43, at 75 (recognizing the need 
to include “human involvement” to facilitate the consideration of “a greater level of complexity in the 
circumstances”); Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 537, 551 (2005) (“[T]echnological controls tend to be relatively blunt instruments for control of 
digital content, unable to accommodate copyright fair use without the re-introduction of human discretion.”). 
84. See Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 43, at 73 (“[A] two-step approach—
technology first, then courts—seems to be the best compromise we can have today, and it is worth 
considering developing such a system as we explore the next generation of [digital rights management] 
systems.”). Niva Elkin-Koren outlined a similar approach: “Algorithmic fair use could . . . involve a two-tier 
review. First, algorithmic screening would be performed and second, for cases which were flagged by the 
system, but were inconclusive, human review would be conducted.” Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1098. 
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far more complex than fair use, involving critical issues of life and death, 
health, financial risks, and national security.85 
II. PATHWAYS FOR LEGAL AUTOMATION 
In addressing the three dominant arguments against fair use automation, 
the previous Part has shown the benefits of greater legal automation in this area. 
If we are to proceed with such automation, we will need to think about the 
different paths that can be taken to automate the fair use standard. Although 
many pathways for legal automation exist, three stand out: (1) translation; (2) 
approximation; and (3) self-determination. While the first two pathways are 
built upon the existence of and reliance on human decisions, the last pathway 
allows for autonomous determinations, which can take place regardless of the 
existence or volume of human decisions. This Part discusses each pathway in 
turn and ties the discussion to the ongoing developments in artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics. 
A. Translation 
The first pathway for automating the fair use standard is translation. The 
scholarly engagement with the need to translate legal standards into computer 
code and algorithms is nothing new. When the Internet first entered the 
mainstream in the mid-1990s, a sizeable literature quickly emerged to discuss 
ways to faithfully translate laws in physical space to cyberspace. For instance, 
Lawrence Lessig reminded us that “code is law” and that algorithms could be 
built to reflect or ignore our constitutional values.86 Focusing on what he coined 
“lex informatica,” the late Joel Reidenberg also called on policymakers to pay 
greater attention to the development of technology rules and to encourage such 
development.87 
While the discussion of the need for translation in the artificial intelligence 
context is a logical extension of this earlier cyberlaw debate, tremendous 
difficulties remain in the efforts to translate legal mandates into computer code 
and algorithms.88 As far as legal automation is concerned, the developers of 
automated fair use systems have the daunting task of figuring out how to build 
 
85. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1096–97 (footnotes omitted). 
86. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 1 (2006). 
87. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998). 
88. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, supra note 39, at 486 (“Translating 
doctrinal law and policy into code may result in significant, albeit unintentional, alterations of meaning, partly 
because the artificial languages intelligible to computers have a more limited vocabulary than human 
languages.” (footnote omitted)). 
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legal rules and outcomes into these systems.89 As Maayan Perel and Niva 
Elkin-Koren observed, “[T]ranslating legal mandates into code inevitably 
embodies particular choices as to how the law is interpreted, which may be 
affected by a variety of extrajudicial considerations, including the conscious and 
unconscious professional assumptions of program developers, as well as 
various private business incentives.”90 In their earlier work, Dan Burk and Julie 
Cohen also expressed skepticism that “system designers will be able to 
anticipate the range of access privileges that may be appropriate for fair uses to 
be made of a particular work . . . [as well as] the types of uses that would be 
considered fair by a court.”91 
Even worse, for a legal standard that courts will only interpret ex post, such 
as the U.S. fair use standard, computer programmers will have to determine in 
advance how the law will affect the outcome—often by making educated 
guesses. While adjudicated cases and their related fact patterns can provide 
helpful guidance, many situations will be of first impression and will therefore 
present substantial translational challenges and complications. A case in point 
is an interesting empirical experiment conducted by Lisa Shay, Woodrow 
Hartzog, John Nelson, and Gregory Conti.92 When they brought together three 
teams of computer programmers to translate a subset of the New York State 
traffic law into computer code for the purpose of determining traffic violations 
based on real-world driving data, they found wide variances in cited violations 
and citation frequency depending on whether the group followed the letter of 
the law, the intent of the law, or additional guidance and instructions from the 
experiment’s designers.93 
One solution that can help alleviate this type of translation-induced 
problem is to conduct periodic audits—both internally and externally—to 
determine whether the laws have been faithfully translated.94 Such audits reflect 
the best practices advocated by the technology community. Principle 7 of the 
ACM Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability declared, 
“Institutions should use rigorous methods to validate their models and 
document those methods and results.”95 The FAT/ML Principles for Accountable 
 
89. See Lisa A. Shay et al., Confronting Automated Law Enforcement, in ROBOT LAW, supra note 16, at 257–
59 (discussing the legal integration of algorithms); Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Autonomous Driving: Regulatory 
Challenges Raised by Artificial Decision-Making and Tragic Choices, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 251, 
262–64 (discussing the need to translate law into algorithm). 
90. Perel & Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering, supra note 39, at 189; see also Shay et al., supra note 89, at 
257 (“[T]hose who specify and implement the code base of a system will likely make their own interpretations 
of legal and illegal behavior, perhaps without any legal training.”).  
91. Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 55. 
92. Lisa A. Shay et al., Do Robots Dream of Electric Laws? An Experiment in the Law as Algorithm, in ROBOT 
LAW, supra note 16, at 274. 
93. See id. 
94. See sources cited supra note 79. 
95. U.S. PUB. POL’Y COUNCIL, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2017), [hereinafter ACM STATEMENT]. 
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Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms also called for impact 
assessment “(at least) three times during the design and development process: 
design stage, pre-launch, and post-launch.”96 As Lorna McGregor, Daragh 
Murray, and Vivian Ng explained: 
During the design and development stage, impact assessments should evaluate 
how an algorithm is likely to work, ensure that it functions as intended and 
identify any problematic processes or assumptions. This provides an 
opportunity to modify the design of an algorithm at an early stage, to build 
in . . . compliance—including monitoring mechanisms—from the outset, or 
to halt development if . . . concerns cannot be addressed. Impact assessments 
should also be conducted at the deployment stage, in order to monitor effects 
during operation. . . . [T]his requires that, during design and development, the 
focus should not only be on testing but steps should also be taken to build in 
effective oversight and monitoring processes that will be able to identify and 
respond to [problems] once the algorithm is deployed.97 
To promote transparency, commentators have called for greater disclosure 
of not only algorithms but also of training data and algorithmic outcomes.98 
While such disclosure will certainly help those who are technology savvy, it is 
often insufficient, especially for those who have difficulty understanding the 
computer code, training process, or selected data involved.99 When learning 
algorithms are deployed, closely scrutinizing the initial algorithms alone is 
 
96. Nicholas Diakopoulos et al., Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for 
Algorithms, FAT/ML, https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2020). FAT/ML stands for “Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning.” 
FAT/ML, https://fatml.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2020). 
97. Lorna McGregor et al., International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic Accountability, 68 
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 309, 330 (2019). 
98. See O’NEIL, supra note 74, at 229 (“We have to learn to interrogate our data collection process, not 
just our algorithms.”); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2017) 
(“What we need instead is a transparency of inputs and results, which allows us to see that the algorithm is 
generating discriminatory impact.”); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 641 
(2017) (“[W]ithout full transparency—including source code, input data, and the full operating environment 
of the software—even the disclosure of audit logs showing what a program did while it was running provides 
no guarantee that the disclosed information actually reflects a computer system’s behavior.”). 
99. See RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 19 (“Only the programmers are in a position to know 
for sure what the algorithm does, and even they might not be clear about what’s going on. In some cases 
there is no way to tell exactly why or how a decision by an algorithm is reached.” (quoting Doc Searls, 
Director, Project VRM, Berkman Klein Center For Internet & Society, Harvard University)); Chander, supra 
note 98, at 1040 (“[T]he algorithm may be too complicated for many others to understand, or even if it is 
understandable, too demanding, timewise, to comprehend fully.”); Kroll et al., supra note 98, at 638 (“The 
source code of computer systems is illegible to nonexperts. In fact, even experts often struggle to understand 
what software code will do, as inspecting source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer 
program will behave.”); Guido Noto La Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making: Algorithmic 
Decisions at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. 
TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 3, 23 (2018) (suggesting that “a technical document which includes the algorithm 
used and the mere explanation of the logic in mathematical terms will not in itself meet the legal requirement 
[for the right to explanation]” and that this requirement “should be interpreted as the disclosure of the 
algorithm with an explanation in non-technical terms of the rationale of the decision and criteria relied 
upon”). 
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unlikely to reveal the full extent of any problems that the automated fair use 
systems may encounter.100 As Kartik Hosanagar and Vivian Jair observed: 
[M]achine learning algorithms—and deep learning algorithms in particular—
are usually built on just a few hundred lines of code. The algorithm[’]s logic is 
mostly learned from training data and is rarely reflected in its source code. 
Which is to say, some of today’s best-performing algorithms are often the 
most opaque.101 
Given these disclosure-related challenges, commentators have called for 
the development of explainable artificial intelligence to help document the 
algorithmic analysis and the training process and to enhance human 
understanding of the algorithmic operation.102 As Pauline Kim explained: 
When a model is interpretable, debate may ensue over whether its use is 
justified, but it is at least possible to have a conversation about whether relying 
on the behaviors or attributes that drive the outcomes is normatively 
 
100. As Yu and Spina Alì observed: 
Deep learning machines can self-reprogram to the point that even their programmers are unable 
to understand the internal logic behind AI decisions. In this context, it is difficult to detect hidden 
biases and to ascertain whether they are caused by a fault in the computer algorithm or by flawed 
datasets. 
Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 76, at 5; see also Chander, supra note 98, at 1040 (“[I]n the era of self-enhancing 
algorithms, the algorithm’s human designers may not fully understand their own creation: even Goog le 
engineers may no longer understand what some of their algorithms do.”). Likewise, Joshua Kroll and his 
collaborators explained: 
Machine learning . . . is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis because it involves situations 
where the decisional rule itself emerges automatically from the specific data under analysis, 
sometimes in ways that no human can explain. In this case, source code alone teaches a reviewer 
very little, since the code only exposes the machine learning method used and not the data-driven 
decision rule. 
Kroll et al., supra note 98, at 638 (footnote omitted). 
101. Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency in Algorithms, but Too Much Can Backfire , 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/we-need-transparency-in-algorithms-but-too-
much-can-backfire; see also Daniel Gervais, Exploring the Interfaces Between Big Data and Intellectual Property Law, 
10 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 3, 5 (2019) (“[A]ny human contribution to the output of 
deep learning systems is ‘second degree’.”). 
102. See ACM STATEMENT, supra note 95, Principle 4 (“Systems and institutions that use algorithmic 
decision-making are encouraged to produce explanations regarding both the procedures followed by the 
algorithm and the specific decisions that are made.”); INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 80, at 68 
(recommending software engineers to “document  all of their systems and related data flows, their 
performance, limitations, and risks,” with emphases on “auditability, accessibility, meaningfulness, and 
readability”); Diakopoulous et al., supra note 96 (“Ensure that algorithmic decisions as well as any data driving 
those decisions can be explained to end-users and other stakeholders in non-technical terms.”). As Yu and 
Spina Alì recounted: 
[A] team at Microsoft is trying to teach AI to show how it weighted every single variable in 
evaluating mortality risk factors. Similarly, a team at Rutgers University is working on a deep 
neural network that provides users with examples that demonstrates why it took a specific 
algorithmic decision. Another project at the University of Berkeley involves lashing two neural 
networks together, tasking one to describe the inner procedures running inside the other. Finally, 
an international team consisting, among the others, of researchers from Facebook, Berkeley and 
the University of Amsterdam has taught an image recognition software to show the evidence he 
relied upon to reach its decisions. 
Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 76, at 7 (footnotes omitted). 
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acceptable. When a model is not interpretable, however, it is not even possible 
to have the conversation.103 
B. Approximation 
The second pathway for automating the fair use standard is approximation. 
It differs from the translation pathway in that its primary goal is not to convert 
legal mandates or analytical approaches into computer code and algorithms, but 
to approximate those decisions that have already been made, or are to be made, 
by humans—whether in a courtroom, as part of law enforcement, or through 
ordinary day-to-day practice.104 Because of the primary focus on end results and 
their correlation to human decisions, algorithm designers are free to come up 
with methods or strategies to facilitate legal automation, including those that 
judges, lawyers, law enforcement personnel, and other human decisionmakers 
have not traditionally used. The additional freedom in this pathway will also 
allow algorithm designers to take full advantage of the technological potential 
provided by deep learning, neural networks, and other advances in artificial 
intelligence.105 
For illustrative purposes, consider the different methods used to determine 
fair use in these two pathways. In the translation pathway, computers will be 
trained, most likely under the supervision of computer programmers,106 to 
conduct fair use analysis based on the factors stipulated in Section 107 of the 
 
103. Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 922–23 (2017). 
104. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 25, at 57–58 (“Judicial determinations and negotiated minimum 
standards are not the only possible measures of current fair use practice; arguably, the more accurate measure 
of fair use is the daily behavior of ordinary users.”). See generally ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET 
AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), 
http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/fair_use_final.pdf (stating the best practices in fair use for 
documentary filmmakers). 
105. As a government report on artificial intelligence explained: 
Deep learning uses structures loosely inspired by the human brain, consisting of a set of units (or 
“neurons”). Each unit combines a set of input values to produce an output value, which in turn 
is passed on to other neurons downstream. For example, in an image recognition application, a 
first layer of units might combine the raw data of the image to recognize simple patterns in the 
image; a second layer of units might combine the results of the first layer to recognize 
patterns-of-patterns; a third layer might combine the results of the second layer; and so on.  
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 9. For discussions of deep learning, see generally ETHEM 
ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 104–09 (2016); JOHN D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 
(2019); JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 121–36 (2018); THIERRY POIBEAU, 
MACHINE TRANSLATION 181–95 (2017). 
106. Machine learning generally can be separated into supervised and unsupervised learning, with the 
latter having no predefined output. See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 105, at 38–42, 111–18 (discussing 
supervised and unsupervised learning); KELLEHER, supra note 105, at 26–30 (discussing supervised, 
unsupervised, and reinforcement learning). Supervision, in this case, will be to set parameters for the 
algorithmic operation or to add predefined outputs to constrain that operation. Although unsupervised 
learning has become increasingly attractive due to its unlimited potential, most artificial intelligence systems 
combine supervised and unsupervised learning techniques. See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with 
the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017) (providing 
an accessible overview of machine learning for lawyers). 
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Copyright Act.107 The way these automated systems undertake individual 
factor-based analyses will likely mirror those taken by human decisionmakers. 
While these systems may end up generating different decisions, human 
experience largely informs the analytical processes that have been coded into 
the systems. In fact, past human decisions, including but not limited to those 
handed down by courts, will be used to train the automated systems to make 
future decisions. 
By contrast, the approximation pathway allows algorithm designers—and, 
in the deep learning world, also artificial intelligence systems themselves—to 
freely determine the methods used to approximate decisions made by judges, 
lawyers, law enforcement personnel, and other human decisionmakers. As these 
methods and strategies are deployed, adjustments will be continuously made, 
utilizing new training data while relying on some or all algorithmic outputs as 
feedback data. As Professor Burk described: 
One can imagine that a neural network or other machine learning system 
could detect these or other patterns in the data surrounding past cases, 
matching them to similar patterns in the data surrounding future fair use 
incidents, situations, and scenarios without formal programming definition of 
the fair use factors.108 
Professor Elkin-Koren noted the scenario in which “AI and machine learning 
would make it difficult for courts to check the rules embedded in the system, 
since these systems may not explicitly demonstrate the legal specifications of 
the four factors of fair use.”109 
In short, if automated systems are able to come up with decisions that have 
a strong correlation to human decisions—for example, with a ninety percent 
match (or whatever percentage society prefers)—that process may be deemed 
satisfactory even if it relies mostly on pattern recognition, as opposed to 
automated legal analyses based on the four statutorily stipulated fair use 
factors.110 After all, the primary focus of the approximation pathway is not on 
whether the automated systems have faithfully translated legal principles and 
techniques, but whether the decisions generated by those systems approximate 
human decisions. 
One could certainly debate whether such approximation could provide an 
acceptable pathway for legal automation.111 After all, thinking like a lawyer is 
 
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
108. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 293. 
109. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1099. 
110. Cf. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1192 (“We should focus on the quality of the proposed AI judge’s 
product, not on the process that yields that product.”). 
111. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 347 (“While one could argue that a proper fair use analysis must 
be conducted the same way as how judges would, one cannot help but wonder whether society would find it 
acceptable to have automated fair use determinations that generate outcomes that have high correlations to 
the outcomes of judge-made decisions.”). 
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what law schools try to instill in future members of the legal profession.112 
Nevertheless, the benefit of this alternative pathway can be quite significant, 
especially considering the growing evidence that intelligent machines can 
perform quite well when left to their own devices.113 To be sure, human 
decisionmakers remain superior in making judgment calls,114 especially with 
respect to circumstances that have not arisen before.115 However, there is 
sufficient evidence to show that intelligent machines can compensate for these 
shortcomings by performing well on matters involving variables or hidden 
relationships that human decisionmakers often overlook. Because humans can 
make certain decisions better than machines, and vice versa, the best-case 
scenario is when the legal system can take full advantage of the superior 
performance of both types of decision-making.116 
There are some significant drawbacks, however. Automated fair use 
systems could consider factors that are highly problematic in democratic society 
and that Congress and courts have treated as protected classes in the anti-
discrimination context,117 such as the race, color, religion, or sex of the author 
or user. In their effort to approximate human decisions, these systems may also 
introduce new factors that the statute and case law have not mentioned or 
anticipated. While the creation of these new factors could spark helpful insights 
and research—on factors that are more predictive of fair use outcomes, 
perhaps—making decisions based on factors that courts do not use or 
anticipate is inherently problematic from a rule-of-law standpoint.118 
 
112. The literature on how to think like a lawyer is vast. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR 
THINKING ABOUT THE LAW (2007); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897); KARL 
N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951); FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2012). 
113. See infra text accompanying notes 126–131. 
114. As Rebecca Crootof observed: 
[T]he judgment we value in a common law process is a distinctively human skill. Human judges 
are sensitive to context, both to extenuating circumstances in individual cases and shifts in social 
norms over time, and can flexibly apply legal rules. While human contextualization may be 
incorporated during the design or training of an AI system, that is hardly the same as having 
human contextualization at the time the algorithmic rule is applied, especially as that application 
may occur in a temporally, geographically, and culturally different context. AI may be consistent, 
but it is “brittle”: “[It lacks] the flexibility humans have to step outside their instructions and apply 
‘common sense’ to adapt to novel situations.”  
Crootof, supra note 8, at 238 (footnotes omitted). 
115. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 59 (noting the weaknesses of machines in making 
predictions “when there is too little data” and concerning “events that are not captured by past experience”); 
Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, supra note 8, at 53 (“Many past efforts to rationalize and algorithmatize the law 
have failed, for good reason: there is no way to fairly extrapolate the thought processes of some body of past 
decisionmaking to all new scenarios.” (emphasis omitted)). 
116. See sources cited infra note 150. 
117. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting workplace discrimination based on “race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin”). 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 165–167.  In defense of automated fair use systems, the use of 
the words “shall include” in Section 107 of the Copyright Act indicates that the statute provides a 
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C. Self-Determination 
The final pathway for automating the fair use standard is 
self-determination—that is, the automated systems will make autonomous 
decisions. While the starting point for the translation and approximation 
pathways is, respectively, to imitate methods or strategies used by humans or to 
approximate decisions they have already made, the self-determination pathway 
places emphasis on independent decision-making. 
In this pathway, automated systems will make decisions that, in their views, 
will best promote creativity and serve the goals designated by computer 
programmers—in this case, the goals of copyright. They will make fair use 
determinations based on what they believe will fulfill those designated goals, as 
opposed to the goal of faithfully translating legal norms into computer code 
and algorithms or the goal of approximating human decisions. 
Providing automated systems with wide autonomy will allow them to 
generate new fair use decisions that differ significantly from those that have 
already been, or are to be, handed down by courts. While such a pathway would 
be highly problematic from a stare decisis standpoint, especially in a common 
law jurisdiction like the United States, that pathway could help generate new 
solutions that may initially sound counterintuitive to human decisionmakers but 
that can in the end be proven to better promote creativity. If the goal of these 
automated systems is to improve the creative environment that copyright law 
supports, the latter can be as appealing as, if not more appealing than, the 
former. 
Indeed, outside the area of fair use and intellectual property law, 
commentators have already documented how computers and artificial 
intelligence can generate seemingly counterintuitive decisions that are ultimately 
superior to human decisions.119 Even more complicated, human 
decisionmakers, due to their own cognitive barriers, may not always be able to 
fully appreciate the merits of these seemingly counterintuitive decisions. As 
Professors Casey and Niblett reminded us: 
Algorithms will often identify counterintuitive connections that may appear 
erroneous to humans even when accurate. Humans should be careful in those 
cases not to undo the very value that was added by the algorithm’s ability to 
recognize these connections. This is especially true when the benefit of the 
algorithm was that it reduced human bias and behavioral errors.120 
 
non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to consider when making fair use determinations. See supra text 
accompanying note 24. Thus, when the automated systems introduce new factors that the statute and case 
law have not mentioned, these factors will not precipitate a direct conflict with the fair use provision. 
119. See Millar & Kerr, supra note 16, at 120–22 (discussing the time when expert robots get better 
decisions than humans). See generally id. at 117–24 (discussing human–robot disagreement). 
120. Casey & Niblett, A Framework, supra note 82, at 354; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 72, 
at 40 (“People often confuse a biased algorithm for an algorithm that doesn’t confirm their biases. If 
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Compared with the translation and approximation pathways, the 
self-determination pathway will minimize these situations by ensuring that the 
automated systems will not immediately discard those machine-made decisions 
that do not correspond well to preexisting human decisions. Nevertheless, 
because this pathway may generate decisions that differ significantly from those 
preexisting decisions, a society that chooses the self-determination pathway 
should put in place mechanisms to address potential conflicts between human 
and machine-made decisions.121 
D. Summary 
Even though this Part has focused on three distinct pathways for legal 
automation, it is important to keep in mind that hybrid routes can be developed 
to incorporate more than one pathway. Indeed, the choice over the best mix of 
pathways will lead algorithm designers to ask some key questions concerning 
how best to automate legal standards and how to address the law–machine 
interface. The next Part will discuss these design questions in greater detail. 
As time passes, and as artificial intelligence technologies continue to 
improve, new pathways may also emerge while some existing ones may become 
obsolete. Should we reach the technological state at which machine-made 
decisions are always preferable to human decisions—a scenario that would 
admittedly be very far away122—the starting point for making legal decisions 
may be intelligent machines, not human decisionmakers. If so, the translation 
and approximation pathways would seem somewhat misguided, as they 
privilege human decisions over machine-made decisions. Those two pathways 
would also become increasingly impractical. After all, machines, not humans, 
would make the majority of decisions, and there might not be enough human 
decisions for machines to translate from or approximate. 
III. LAW–MACHINE INTERFACE 
The previous Part has identified three distinct pathways for legal 
automation that can help enlist algorithms and artificial intelligence to 
 
Facebook shows more liberal stories than conservative, that doesn’t mean something is wrong. It could be a 
reflection of their user base, or of their media sources, or just random chance .” (quoting an anonymous 
principal consultant of a consulting firm)); Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, 
Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 158 (2016) (“[I]t is not uncommon for pilots in 
the cockpit to be surprised or confused by an automated activity undertaken by an autopilot system.”). See 
generally Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1085 (2018) (documenting the limitations of intuition while noting the need to address inscrutability). 
121. See discussion infra Part III.B, III.C. 
122. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 8, at 2004 (“[F]or the foreseeable future, software systems that aim to 
replace systems of social ordering will succeed best as human-machine hybrids, mixing scale and efficacy with 
human adjudication for hard cases.”). 
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modernize the legal system. This Part turns to a key issue that most 
commentators have overlooked: the law–machine interface. To illustrate the 
different questions on algorithmic design that will emerge in relation to this 
interface, this Part focuses on three distinct issues: (1) the allocation of 
decision-making power; (2) the hierarchy of decisions; and (3) the legal effects 
of machine-made decisions. The more algorithm designers think through 
questions involving these issues, the more success they will likely have in 
charting an effective path toward legal automation. 
A. Allocation of Decision-Making Power 
When machine-made decisions are inferior to human decisions, it is logical 
that technology will be used only, or mostly, to assist humans in making 
decisions. By default, decision-making power resides in humans. However, as 
artificial intelligence technologies continue to improve and as intelligent 
machines become capable of making better decisions—at least in select 
areas123—questions will arise over the allocation of decision-making power.124 
Should machines at least make some decisions?125 If so, what are those 
decisions? Should those machine-made decisions receive deference in the legal 
system? 
With growing evidence on the machines’ ability to outperform humans in 
select areas, answering these questions has become increasingly challenging. For 
instance, researchers have documented the advantage of using learning 
algorithms to diagnose cancer and to perform other tasks in the health area.126 
 
123. See Millar & Kerr, supra note 16, at 117 (“Once there are expert robots, it will be easier to argue in 
some instances that they ought to be used to their full potential, because the evidence will suggest that in those 
instances they will, on average, deliver better results than human experts.”). 
124. For example, Tim Wu asked: “Just when and why are decisions brought to human attention, and 
who decides when a human should decide?” Wu, supra note 8, at 2027. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and 
Thomas Ramge asked a similar question: “Which decisions should we reserve for ourselves and which should 
we delegate?” VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE 
AGE OF BIG DATA 219 (2018). 
125. As Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge observed: 
If data-driven adaptive systems will offer us better answers to questions such as which school we 
should send our kids to or which hospital an ambulance should take us to in case of an emergency, 
then should we delegate that decision to the machines or retain it as the exclusive province of 
human responsibility? What are we aiming for in decisions, anyway—getting the correct answer 
or the one that makes us happy (after all, we, not the machines, must live with the consequences)? 
Until now we rarely faced such choices, but in the future we routinely will. Developing a good, 
solid sense of how to choose is a core competency we’ll have to develop and maintain. 
 This ability to choose what to choose is fundamentally empowering to humans. It preserves our 
chance to contribute to the fate of the universe and may ensure us an enduring seat at the table 
of evolution. 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & RAMGE, supra note 124, at 219–20. 
126. See ERIC J. TOPOL, DEEP MEDICINE: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN MAKE 
HEALTHCARE HUMAN AGAIN 117–18 (2019) (discussing the impressive progress in algorithmic image 
processing); Jonathan Guo & Li Bin, The Application of Medical Artificial Intelligence Technology in Rural Areas of 
Developing Countries, 2 HEALTH EQUITY 174, 175 (2018) (noting research showing that systems using deep 
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Commentators have also noted that algorithms “are better and faster than 
humans at detecting credit card fraud,”127 not to mention that “[m]achines can 
pool their resources in ways that humans cannot.”128 In addition, the 
performance of intelligent machines will not be affected by emotion, 
exhaustion, stress, or other cognitive barriers.129 These machines “can [also] be 
tested and [therefore] improved.”130 Should errors be found and corrected, the 
machines “are unlikely to make the same mistake[s] again.”131 
Given such superior performance, one cannot help but wonder whether 
machines, as opposed to humans, should make more decisions. In several 
narrow areas that require instantaneous responses, such as those involving the 
application of emergency brakes in automobiles, we have already given 
machines significant power to make those decisions.132 
For illustrative purposes, consider the automated analysis of the four 
statutorily stipulated fair use factors. While an automated system may find it 
challenging to analyze the first factor concerning “the purpose and character of 
 
convolutional neural networks are “able to classify skin cancer at a comparable level to dermatologists” and 
“could improve the speed, accuracy, and consistency of diagnosis [of breast cancer metastasis in lymph 
nodes], as well as reduce the false negative rate to a quarter of the rate experienced by human pathologists”).  
127. Digital Decisions, supra note 76. 
128. RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 261 
(2005) [hereinafter KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR]. 
129. See Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 111, 144 
(“Unlike humans, algorithms do not have self-interests affecting their judgement, they do not omit any of the 
decision-making stages or base their decisions on heuristics or biases, and they are not subject to human 
physical or emotional limitations such as exhaustion, stress or emotionality.” (footnotes omitted)); Crootof, 
supra note 8, at 236 (noting that a “judge’s sensitivity to context and penchant for leniency may vary 
dramatically with whether they are hungry, tired, bored, overworked, overwhelmed, or otherwise distracted”); 
Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L. REV. 813, 834 (2018) 
(“AI does not suffer from perceptual limitations the way that humans do.”); Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan, 
Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22,611, 2016), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22611.pdf (documenting the surprising impact of unexpected outcomes of 
football games on the type and length of sentences handed down by juvenile court judges); Kurt Kleiner, 
Lunchtime Leniency: Judges’ Rulings Are Harsher When They Are Hungrier, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2011), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lunchtime-leniency (“Judges granted 65 percent of requests 
they heard at the beginning of the day’s session and almost none at the end. Right after a snack break, 
approvals jumped back to 65 percent again.” (citing a study at Ben Gurion University in Israel and Columbia 
University examining more than 1,000 decisions by eight Israeli judges who ruled on convicts’ parole 
requests)). 
130. MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 69, at 53. 
131. Id. As the authors observed, “[I]t is a lot harder to get humans to acknowledge their biases (how 
many avowed racists or sexists do you know?), let alone do the hard work required to overcome them.” Id. 
132. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 112 (“Carmakers in the United States have reached an 
agreement with the Department of Transportation to make automatic emergency braking standard on 
vehicles by 2022.”); Millar & Kerr, supra note 16, at 118 (“[C]ases that are time-sensitive—critical emergency 
room admissions, perhaps, or cases where [Google driverless cars] need to make split-second decisions about 
how best to navigate rapidly evolving traffic situations—might afford human experts the time to disagree 
with the robot, but little or no time to evaluate the underlying rationales to come to anything resembling a 
meaningful conclusion about the sources of disagreement.”). 
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the use”133 of the copyrighted work,134 it may find the analysis of other factors 
easier. A case in point is the analysis of the third factor, which focuses on “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole.”135 When analyzing this factor, courts usually engage in both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses.136 For computers, quantitative analyses are 
the easiest.137 In fact, any judge wanting to make an efficient and effective 
comparison will deploy computers to undertake some of the comparative tasks, 
such as counting the number of words in the original work and the potentially 
infringing work.138 
By contrast, qualitative analyses seem to be much more challenging. After 
all, how can an automated system know which part of the copyrighted work is 
highly important, especially considering that computers and robots are 
notorious for their lack of emotion and empathy?139 Indeed, determining what 
 
133. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
134. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 292 (“[C]oncepts like ‘educational use’ or ‘news 
reporting’ might be unexpectedly tricky to reduce to computable code. But one can, for example, imagine 
programming a system to determine, perhaps on the basis of geolocational data and scraped calendaring or 
advertising data, whether a nondramatic musical work is being performed at an agricultural fair.”); Felten, 
supra note 46, at 58 (identifying the “[l]ack of knowledge about the circumstances” of the use as one of the 
two key reasons why fair use cannot be built into digital rights management systems (emphasis omitted)). 
However, Professor Elkin-Koren disagreed: 
[One] concern [regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use] is that algorithms that analyze 
fair use will fail to process information that is external to the content itself. For instance, 
determining the nature of use may require external information and additional analysis of facts. 
Yet, algorithms could be programmed to extract and analyze data from external sources. For 
instance, educational use might be determined based on tagging the nature of the user. A program 
could detect the type of user (e.g., educational institution, governmental agency) based on the 
domain name (e.g., .edu, .gov) or by checking registration in external databases. Another 
indication for the nature of use could be the type of tagging selected by the party that uploads the 
work (educational, commercial, personal/private use). The commercial nature of use might 
actually be determined by the presence of advertisements, or other means of monetizing the 
content. External information might also be used to determine “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market” for the copyrighted work, using the commercial nature of use as a proxy.  
Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1095–96. Whether the automated system can extract and analyze data from 
external sources, as Professor Elkin-Koren proposed, will depend largely on whether an enabling 
environment exists to allow for such extraction and analysis. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 351–63 
(underscoring the need to build this enabling environment). 
135. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
136. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (“[The third] factor calls for 
thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance, too.”); 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 583 n.6 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“The inquiry into the substantiality of appropriation has a quantitative and a qualitative aspect.”). 
137. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1096 (“Some fair use considerations might be relatively easy to 
automate, such as the amount copied from the original work. For instance, a program could give a higher fair 
use score based on similarity of less than 10 percent.”). 
138. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 344 (“[A]ny judge seeking to undertake a quick quantitative 
analysis will likely rely on computer assistance to count words or compare sizes.”). 
139. See LEE, supra note 4, at 142 (“Taking the next step to emotionally intelligent robots may require 
self-awareness, humor, love, empathy, and appreciation for beauty. These are the key hurdles that separate 
what AI does today—spotting correlations in data and making predictions—and artificial general 
intelligence.”); MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 69, at 123 (“[T]he ability to work effectively with 
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courts have referred to as the “heart” of the work140 will likely require the 
professional judgment of human decisionmakers.141 Nevertheless, Amazon 
now has a large trove of data concerning which pages or sentences of a book 
Kindle users have highlighted.142 Netflix also has substantial, and at times 
shocking, data about which part of a movie or a TV program its subscribers 
have paused or viewed repeatedly.143 In fact, with the deployment of big data 
analysis and the utilization of external market data, the automated system may 
be able to generate some useful predictions on which part of the copyrighted 
work will likely be popular or commercially successful. Even though these 
indicators alone may not show what courts would consider as the heart of the 
copyrighted work, the increased availability of these indicators does suggest the 
machines’ growing ability to make automated fair use determinations. 
Similar to the third-factor analysis, computers can also analyze quite well 
the fourth factor, which concerns “the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”144 On its face, analyzing the actual 
or potential market of a copyrighted work will require professional expertise. 
As Professor Felten observed more than a decade ago, “[T]he fourth factor in 
the [fair use] test . . . requires reasoning about the economics of a particular 
market, a task even well-trained humans find difficult.”145 In reality, computers 
and artificial intelligence have already been actively deployed to provide 
predictive analyses in many areas that are far more complex, challenging, and 
volatile than predicting the market of a copyrighted work.146 In the financial 
industry, for example, it is increasingly common to find computers making 
 
people’s emotional states and social drives will remain a deeply human skill for some time to come.”); TOPOL, 
supra note 126, at 290 (“[H]uman empathy is not something machines can truly simulate, despite ongoing 
efforts to design sociable robots or apps that promote empathy.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for 
Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1269–71 (1992) (discussing the lack of capacity in artificial 
intelligence for feelings). 
140. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588–89 (discussing the use of “the ‘heart’ of the original” in the 
parody context); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 600 (analyzing whether the defendant magazine “had taken ‘the 
heart of the book’”). 
141. See Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 292 (noting the difficulty in programming an 
automated fair use system “to determine . . . whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to 
constitute the ‘heart’ of an author’s creation”). 
142. See Viewing Popular Highlights on Kindles, EBOOK READER (Feb. 15, 2018), https://blog.the-ebook-
reader.com/2018/02/15/viewing-popular-highlights-on-kindles (“Popular Highlights show the most 
highlighted passages that readers have added to Kindle books. . . . Amazon also displays how many times 
each passage has been highlighted.”). 
143. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: Streaming and the Dawn 
of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1587 (2019) (“Some parameters that Netflix tracks include, 
but are likely not limited to, pause/rewind/fast-forward behavior; day of the week; date of viewing; time of 
viewing; zip code; preferred devices; completion rate; user ratings; user search behavior; and browsing and 
scrolling behavior.”). 
144. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
145. Felten, supra note 46, at 58. 
146. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1097 (“AI has already been applied for decision-making 
processes in contexts that are far more complex than fair use, involving critical issues of life and death, health, 
financial risks, and national security.”). 
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predictions about stock values or prices.147 There is also a fast-growing literature 
on the use of artificial intelligence in finance.148 
In sum, society will continue to rely on humans to make certain decisions, 
especially those involving judgment calls or those lacking in historical data. 
Meanwhile, machines can be utilized to make other decisions. Even if those 
machine-made decisions are not better than human decisions, the machines’ 
ability to provide decisions in real time, or close to real time, will make the 
former highly appealing.149 For creative projects that do not involve substantial 
investments, many users will likely find instantaneous fair use determinations 
more useful than time-delayed decisions rendered by professional experts, as 
long as there is no significant variation in quality. 
Because humans and machines can make better decisions in different areas, 
commentators have started to highlight the importance of enabling two types 
of decisions to complement each other.150 For instance, Lee Kai-fu provided “a 
blueprint for human coexistence with AI.”151 Frank Levy and Richard Murnane 
discussed the importance of a “new division of labor” that aims to maximize 
the comparative advantage of both humans and machines.152 Mary Gray and 
 
147. See Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 129, at 116 (“In finance, algorithms are used for assessing credit 
risks and mortgage risks, pricing complex insurance products, stocks ranking, or in general, creating financial 
forecasts.”). 
148. The literature emergent in this area is vast and fast-growing. See generally Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial 
Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 (2019) (discussing the risks and limitations of 
financial artificial intelligence); William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 337 
(2020) (discussing the dangers and real-world limitations of deploying artificial intelligence in finance); Dirk 
A. Zetzsche et al., Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Putting the Human in the Loop (Univ. of Hong Kong Fac. of L. 
Working Paper, Paper No. 2020/006, 2020) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3531711 (discussing the increasing 
role of artificial intelligence in finance, with a focus on human responsibilities). 
149. See Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 346 (“[Automated fair use systems] will be able to draw 
conclusions more quickly than humans, and will thereby facilitate real-time market analysis that will be both 
costly and time-consuming when conducted manually.”). 
150. As Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb observed in the context of cancer diagnostics: 
The human and the machine are good at different aspects of prediction. The human pathologist 
was usually right when saying there was cancer. It was unusual to have a situation in which the 
human said there was cancer but was mistaken. In contrast, the AI was much more accurate when 
saying the cancer wasn’t there. The human and the machine made different types of mistakes. By 
recognizing these different abilities, combining human and machine prediction overcame these 
weaknesses, so their combination dramatically reduced the error rate. 
AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 65; see also Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 282 (“[H]uman and 
AI judges might collaborate by operating in tandem at specified stages of the judicial process, either by 
functioning with a human in-the-loop or by preserving an extra measure of human oversight and involvement 
at particular points.”); Paul Scharre, Centaur Warfighting: The False Choice of Humans vs. Automation, 30 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 151, 151 (2016) (“[I]n many situations, human-machine teaming in engagement 
decisions will not only be possible but preferable. Hybrid human-machine cognitive architectures will be able 
to leverage the precision and reliability of automation without sacrificing the robustness and flexibility of 
human intelligence.”); Wu, supra note 8, at 2005 (“[W]hen it comes to systems that replace the law, designers 
should be thinking harder about how best to combine the strengths of humans and machines, by 
understanding the human advantages of providing a sense of procedural fairness, explainability, and the 
deciding of hard cases.”). 
151. See LEE, supra note 4, at 197–225. 
152. LEVY & MURNANE, supra note 17. 
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Siddharth Suri documented the large pool of humans performing “ghost work” 
that is indispensable to advances in the field of artificial intelligence.153 Sarah 
Roberts provided an important ethnographic study of human commercial 
content moderators, who work behind the scenes to screen and remove 
content, enforce policies on online platforms, and improve the outcomes of 
automated moderation.154 Thus, should humans and machines be making 
decisions at the same time, it will be highly important to decide how to allocate 
decision-making power between humans and machines. For those with 
economic acumen, it will also be fruitful to find ways to maximize the optimality 
of such allocation. 
B. Hierarchy of Decisions 
Once we have decided how to allocate decision-making power, the next 
key design question concerns the hierarchy of decisions—or the establishment 
of a set of decisional rules.155 For the foreseeable future, human decisions will 
trump machine-made decisions in most, if not all, cases. However, as society 
becomes more accustomed to artificial intelligence and more willing to trust 
machine-made decisions, the latter will receive more deference—either in select 
areas or be given more weight in the overall decisions. As a result, the hierarchy 
of decisions may begin to shift away from a hegemony of human decisions. 
Consider, for instance, the context of automated copyright enforcement, 
which provides one of the most widely used examples of automated legal 
systems.156 While machines have been used to identify potential infringing 
 
153. See generally MARY L. GRAY & SIDDHARTH SURI, GHOST WORK: HOW TO STOP SILICON VALLEY 
FROM BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL UNDERCLASS (2019). As they explained: 
Beyond some basic decisions, today’s artificial intelligence can’t function without humans in the 
loop. Whether it’s delivering a relevant newsfeed or carrying out a complicated texted -in pizza 
order, when the artificial intelligence . . . trips up or can’t finish the job, thousands of businesses 
call on people to quietly complete the project. This new digital assembly line aggregates the 
collective input of distributed workers, ships pieces of projects rather than products, and operates 
across a host of economic sectors at all times of the day and night.  
Id. at ix–x. Falling within “ghost work” are such tedious tasks as content classification, image tagging, photo 
comparison, video screening, and data cleaning. See id. at x–xxiii. The book further discussed the need for 
human workers to develop datasets that are used for training artificial intelligence and how the new advances, 
in turn, have generated new cycles that require even more human workers to complete intervening tasks. 
They described these cycles as “the paradox of automation’s last mile”: “Humans trained an AI, only to have 
the AI ultimately take over the task entirely. Researchers could then open up even harder problems. . . . These 
problems needed yet more training data, generating another wave of ghost work.” Id. at 8. 
154. See generally SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE 
SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019). As she observed, “Issues of scale aside, the complex process of sorting 
user-uploaded material into either the acceptable or the rejected pile is far beyond the capabilities of software 
or algorithms alone.” Id. at 34. 
155. This hierarchy of decisions immediately brings to mind Isaac Asimov’s Second Law of Robotics: 
“A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the 
First Law [which states that a robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being 
to come to harm].” ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 25, 37 (Del Rey, reprint ed. 2008). 
156. See sources cited supra note 39. 
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materials, human oversight has been built into the systems to ensure verification 
before takedown requests are sent to online service providers or platforms.157 
Indeed, when incorrect requests have been made, the copyright holder or its 
supportive industry group often explains away the mistake by showing how the 
human involved has failed to properly verify the alleged infringement.158 
In recent years, however, we have seen the growing use of robo notices, 
automatic takedown notices that are being sent out by computers to online 
service providers or platforms with no or insufficient human oversight.159 Part 
of the reason for the popularity of these robo notices is their ability to respond 
to the unmanageable volume of copyrighted works that are now being 
disseminated and the exceedingly large amount of potential infringement that 
is being found on the Internet.160 Another key reason is that economics favor 
the use of such automated notices, especially when there is no penalty for 
sending out incorrect notices.161 Indeed, commentators have lamented the 
growing impact of a large volume of robo notices that has now been sent to 
online service providers and platforms without human oversight.162 In short, 
 
157. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The DMCA 
already requires copyright owners to make an initial review of the potentially infringing material prior to 
sending a takedown notice; indeed, it would be impossible to meet any of the requirements of Section 512(c) 
without doing so.”). 
158. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, ZDNET (May 13, 2003, 11:42 
GMT), https://www.zdnet.com/article/riaa-apologizes-for-threatening-letter (reporting the claim of the 
Recording Industry Association of America that the failure of a temporary employee to follow its established 
protocol was the reason behind a wrongful takedown notice sent to Penn State University that had almost 
caused the departmental server to shut down during the final examination period). 
159. See generally Joe Karaganis & Jennifer Urban, The Rise of the Robo Notice, COMM. ACM, Sept. 2015, 
at 28 (expressing concern about the growing use of robo notices to remove potential ly infringing copyrighted 
materials). 
160. Cf. id. at 28 (noting “the adoption of automated notice-sending systems by rights holder groups 
responding to sophisticated infringing sites”); Perel & Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering, supra note 39, at 190–
91 (“[P]rivate, online intermediaries . . . often use robots to handle the immense traffic of online content.”); 
Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 347–48 (“With the creation and dissemination of hundreds of exabytes of data 
and digital content every day, it is almost impossible for technology platforms to not rely on algorithms to 
determine whether a specific use of a copyrighted work has complied with copyright law.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
161. Although Section 512(f) of the Copyright Act penalizes those who “knowingly materially 
misrepresent[]” information, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), “copyright’s ambiguity assures that many statements of 
infringement can be made in good faith, even though a court may find that no infringement actually exists.” 
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First 
Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1888 n.278 (2000); see also Karaganis & Urban, supra note 159, at 30 (“Stronger 
liability for reckless or malicious notice use might be a good step in curbing the worst notice practices , which 
can include deceptive or predatory behavior. But such changes are currently a dead letter in U.S. copyright 
politics.”). 
162. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering, supra note 39, at 204 (“[R]ecent studies prove that 
prominent [online service providers], facing a flood of robo-takedown notices sent automatically by 
right-holders, substitute human review of the vast majority of these notices with their own privately designed 
automated systems.”); Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 40, at 543 (“[I]n spite of the DMCA’s requirement 
that takedown notices attest to the complaining party’s ‘good faith belief’ in infringement, massive volumes 
of such notices are clearly sent, and often acted upon, without meaningful human review.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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the change in technological environment and social preferences has caused 
society to give machine-made decisions more deference than they once had. 
Similar changes can be found in the fair use context. Although fair use 
decisions could be made with built-in human oversight, the large volumes of 
online content that are being evaluated for fair use purposes will likely require 
the development of automated systems.163 If so, humans will have to provide 
oversight after the fact. 
One possibility for providing such oversight ex post is to allow 
machine-made decisions to be challenged in a court of law.164 Upon such a 
challenge, a judge will be able to intervene should the automated system reach 
a wrong or undesirable decision. The allowance for judicial intervention 
precipitates the need to think more deeply about the hierarchy of decisions—
Should judges always trump machines? From a rule-of-law or constitutional 
standpoint, there are considerable benefits to reserving final decisions to human 
judges.165 As Tim Wu reminded us, a key advantage of retaining the use of 
human courts is procedural fairness.166 As he observed, “There 
are . . . advantages to adjudication as a form of social ordering that are difficult 
to replicate by any known means.”167 
One caveat that is worth noting in this area concerns the challenge of 
deciding when to undertake human intervention. Just because the automated 
systems have made decisions that differ significantly from what human judges 
would have rendered does not mean that those machine-made decisions are 
wrong or undesirable.168 When these decisions are challenged before courts, 
 
163. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 67 (“One major benefit of prediction machines is that they 
can scale in a way that humans cannot.”); TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: 
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 97 
(2018) (“Artificial intelligence techniques offer . . . to solve the problem of scale.”); Wu, supra note 8, at 2002 
(“Compared with the legal system, software has enormous advantages of scale and efficacy of enforcement. 
It might tirelessly handle billions if not trillions of decisions in the time it takes a human court to decide a 
single case.”); Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 347–49 (discussing the scalability of automated fair use systems).  
164. See sources cited supra note 84. 
165. See Michaels, supra note 8 (discussing the negative impact of automated adjudication on legal 
change, separation of powers, and the rule of law); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 262–78 (noting 
the concerns that artificial intelligence-based adjudication will make the legal system more incomprehensible, 
data-based, alienating, and disillusioning). 
166. See Wu, supra note 8, at 2002 (“One set of advantages [of human courts] . . . is related to procedural 
fairness.”); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic 
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1554–57 (2019) (recapitulating the literature on algorithmic due 
process); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 284 (“The idea of mechanized verdicts, especially criminal 
verdicts, . . . seems to cut at the heart of democratic self-government, as well as due process.”); Olivier 
Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 252, 261 (2019) (“Human review is essential today 
because it confers a degree of legitimacy on the platforms’ moderation choices.”) . See generally Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26 (2007) (discussing the importance of procedural justice). 
167. Wu, supra note 8, at 2002. 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 119–120. The converse is also true. Just because the automated 
systems have made decisions that coincide with what human judges would have rendered does not mean that 
those decisions are necessarily more correct or desirable. Cf. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The 
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014) (“Scoring systems have a 
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judges will have to use their own professional judgment to determine whether 
to retain those seemingly incorrect or counterintuitive machine-made decisions. 
Indeed, making such determinations will remain a key exercise of judicial 
discretion. 
Finally, should society decide to let machines make at least some 
autonomous decisions, we can still have a hierarchy of decisions favoring 
humans—for instance, by providing an opportunity to have an override.169 A 
good example in this area concerns those algorithms that have been deployed 
in cars to facilitate automatic lane correction.170 When a car veers into another 
lane, those built-in algorithms will quickly help the driver steer the car back to 
its original lane. Should the driver disagree with the computer-made decision, 
the human decisionmaker can hold on to the steering wheel or turn it in the 
opposite direction to initiate an override. By providing this override, the 
algorithms involved preserve a hierarchy of decisions that favors human 
decisions. Such an arrangement contrasts significantly with the arrangement for 
the automatic application of emergency brakes, in which machine-made 
decisions will trump human decisions. 
C. Legal Effects of Machine-Made Decisions 
Once we have figured out the hierarchy of decisions, there remains the final 
design question concerning what legal effects machine-made decisions will 
have.171 For instance, in an environment in which humans can intervene by 
making decisions that trump machine-made decisions, there will always be 
questions concerning what legal effects machine-made decisions will have 
should no human decisionmaker intervene.172 In an environment in which both 
 
powerful allure—their simplicity gives the illusion of precision and reliability. But predictive algorithms can 
be anything but accurate and fair.”); Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal 
Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1075 (2018) (“[P]redictive algorithms . . . create an illusory 
‘technocratic framing’ of who is dangerous and who deserves greater punishment, even though the 
algorithms’ conclusions are based on the same flawed data.”); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in 
Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 304, 375 (2018) (“Risk assessment tools wear the clothes of an evidence-based 
practice—they are developed with the use of large data sets and sophistical techniques and endorsed by social 
scientists running policy simulations—but risk assessments should not be considered evidence-based until 
they have shown to be effective.”). 
169. See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 282 (“[H]uman and AI judges might collaborate by 
operating in tandem at specified stages of the judicial process, either by functioning with a human in-the-loop 
or by preserving an extra measure of human oversight and involvement at particular points.”).  
170. See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 18 (noting the “advanced cruise controls that 
keep a car in its lane”). 
171. Professor Hildebrandt defined legal effect as follows: “Legal effect denotes the consequences  that 
legal norms attach to specific actions or states; legal effect changes the legal status of a person or other entity 
and attributes the ensuing rights and obligations to legal subjects.” HILDEBRANDT, supra note 10, at 168. 
172. Cf. Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL 
FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 175, 177–80 (Roger Brownsword & Karen 
Yeung eds., 2008) [hereinafter REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES] (discussing the distinction between 
technological and legal normativity); Bert-Jaap Koops, Criteria for Normative Technology: The Acceptability of ‘Code 
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humans and machines will make different legal decisions at the same time, or 
in which human decisions do not always trump machine-made decisions, this 
type of question will be raised even more frequently and will take on even 
greater significance. 
Consider once again the case study of fair use automation. Should a user 
receive a machine-made fair use determination, would that determination have 
any legal effect in the sense that it will protect the user from future legal liability? 
This question will be important even if human judges can always intervene by 
overturning machine-made decisions. After all, if the machine-made decision 
has the force of law, and the user has in fact relied on that decision to 
disseminate the allegedly infringing content, that user will not infringe on the 
protected work until the court overturns the decision. If the machine-made 
determination is recognized by multiple platforms, including platforms that are 
available overseas, giving legal effects to machine-made decisions can help 
facilitate content distribution across these platforms, both domestically and 
globally. 
By contrast, if the machine-made determination has no legal effect, the 
infringement can be traced back to the time before the court makes its fair use 
decision, even though a judge could reduce the damage award based on 
evidence of good-faith reliance on the machine-made determination. To be 
sure, users are unlikely to seek machine-made fair use determinations if they 
know in advance that such determinations will have no legal effects. However, 
because fair use determinations are often made at gateways when platform users 
upload content for dissemination, these users will still have strong incentives to 
seek those determinations or will have no choice but to go through with such 
determinations. For example, YouTube users seek machine-made 
determinations not because they rely on the legal effects of those 
determinations, but because such determinations are part of the content 
uploading process.173 
Finally, in determining the legal effects of machine-made decisions, one 
could take a middle approach by giving those decisions some deference while 
retaining some legal liability.174 For instance, with respect to copyright 
infringement, society could introduce laws to allow machine-made fair use 
 
as Law’ in Light of Democratic and Constitutional Values, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES, supra, at 157, 161 
(“The way in which a legal norm is translated and inscribed in technology is a separate activity that should be 
assessed in its own right, because ‘law in the books’ is not and cannot be exactly the same as ‘law in 
technology’.”); Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, supra note 25, at 297 (“Patterns detected by a machine evaluating 
fair use-related data should not be confused with a legal institutional determination of fair use.”); Elkin -
Koren, supra note 43, at 1099 (“AI systems do not decide fair use, but simply generate a score that reflects 
the probability of fair use.”). 
173. See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing YouTube’s Content ID system). 
174. Cf. Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 19, 2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots (advancing in the 
context of automated weapons the trichotomy of “Human-in-the-Loop,” “Human-on-the-Loop,” and 
“Human-out-of-the-Loop”). 
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determinations to absolve the user from the legal liability for compensation 
beyond what he or she has received. However, those laws could state that such 
determination will not prevent the user from being subject to an accounting of 
profit. Such a middle approach will likely be important to noncommercial users, 
as many of them will have limited economic resources and will actively rely on 
low-cost, or no-cost, machine-made decisions to advance their creative 
projects.175 
IV. THE FUTURE 
Commentators have widely discussed the impact of artificial intelligence on 
the legal system. As Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee reminded us, the 
change brought about by artificial intelligence will take effect “[g]radually and 
then suddenly,”176 recalling Ernest Hemingway’s famous description of how 
one goes bankrupt in The Sun Also Rises.177 Noting the large-scale ramifications 
in what they have coined “the Second Machine Age,” Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
observed: 
Progress on some of the oldest and toughest challenges associated with 
computers, robots, and other digital gear was gradual for a long time. Then in 
the past few years it became sudden; digital gear started racing ahead, 
accomplishing tasks it had always been lousy at and displaying skills it was not 
supposed to acquire anytime soon.178 
Likewise, Lee Kai-fu lamented that “time is one thing that the AI revolution is 
not inclined to grant us.”179 
In the past few decades, commentators have widely explored how artificial 
intelligence will affect the legal field.180 In view of this burgeoning and 
ever-growing literature, this Part does not intend to rehash prior research. 
Instead, it focuses on the various lessons we can glean from the earlier 
discussion of the interplay of artificial intelligence and the law. Although these 
lessons were drawn from a close analysis of automated fair use systems, they 
can be easily generalized to inform other bodies of law or the larger legal system. 
Covering the legislature, the bench, the bar, and academe, this Part underscores 
 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (discussing the benefits of automated systems in 
providing low-cost fair use determinations). 
176. ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, 
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 20 (2014). 
177. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES 109 (Hemingway Library ed., 2014) (1926). 
178. BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 176, at 20. 
179. LEE, supra note 4, at 152. 
180. See sources cited supra note 8. 
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our need to carefully analyze the potential impact of technological change on 
not only the law but also legal institutions.181 
A. Law 
In Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law, Mireille Hildebrandt asked a highly 
provocative question concerning whether advances in artificial intelligence will 
spell the end of the law as we know it.182 As she observed: 
If we do not learn how to uphold and extend the legality that protects 
individual persons against arbitrary or unfair state interventions, the law will 
lose its hold on our imagination. It may fold back into a tool to train, discipline 
or influence people whose behaviours are measured and calculated to be 
nudged into compliance, or, the law will be replaced by techno-regulation, 
whether or not that is labelled as law.183 
In the end, she concluded that whether the law as we know it will “end” 
“depends on how we design, construct and develop our information and 
communication infrastructures and how we engage with the mindless agents 
that will ‘people’ our onlife world.”184 To ensure the significantly more desirable 
outcome, she called on us to “build[] legal protection into our artefactual 
environment, reinventing recalcitrance . . . as well as the means to generate 
values and added value in a shared onlife world that celebrates and affords both 
democracy and the Rule of Law.”185 
While Professor Hildebrandt was right that the law will still have important 
roles to play, the growing interplay of artificial intelligence and the law suggests 
that the role of law will change in at least three distinct ways. First, given the 
ever-growing algorithmic deployment to make legal decisions at the same time, 
the line between human and machine-made decisions will increasingly blur. 
While the law will initially leave most decisions to human decisionmakers, it is 
only a matter of time before people become more comfortable with 
machine-made decisions, especially on matters involving narrow or trivial areas. 
Moreover, if technology has improved to a state where machine-made decisions 
can closely approximate human decisions, it may be difficult to distinguish 
between these two types of decisions. Their indistinguishability immediately 
brings to mind the ongoing discussions in artificial intelligence literature relating 
 
181. See COHEN, supra note 47, at 2 (underscoring the need to understand “how both 
information-economy disputes and new informational capabilities are reshaping the enterprise of law at the 
institutional level”). 
182. HILDEBRANDT, supra note 10. 
183. Id. at xiii. 
184. Id.; see also LEE, supra note 4, at xi (“Our AI future will be created by us, and it will reflect the 
choices we make and the actions we take.”). 
185. HILDEBRANDT, supra note 10, at xiii. 
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to passing the Turing test,186 machine superintelligence,187 and technological 
singularity.188 
Second, because intelligent machines will play increasingly important roles 
in the legal process, and computer code and algorithms are not as territorially 
tethered as the law, global and foreign norms will likely have a bigger impact on 
local decision-making processes than what we currently have in our legal 
system.189 Just like how laws that have been transplanted abroad bring values 
 
186. Developed by Alan Turing, this test determines whether one can distinguish between the 
intelligent behavior exhibited by a machine from that of a human. See A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950) (advancing the Turing test). Interestingly, Turing believed that humans would 
be able to create a machine that can pass his test at the end of the twentieth century. See id. at 442 (“I believe 
that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that 
one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.”). By contrast, Ray 
Kurzweil set the date much later—at around 2029. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES 
222 (1999); KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR, supra note 128, at 263. 
187. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 222 (discussing superintelligence in machines). See generally 
RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES (1990) (providing an overview of intelligent 
machines and exploring whether machines can be intelligent and what it means for them to be so).  
188. As the Obama Administration observed in its white paper: 
People have long speculated on the implications of computers becoming more intelligent than 
humans. Some predict that a sufficiently intelligent AI could be tasked with developing even 
better, more intelligent systems, and that these in turn could be used to create systems with yet 
greater intelligence, and so on, leading in principle to an “intelligence explosion” or “singularity” 
in which machines quickly race far ahead of humans in intelligence. 
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 8; see also KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR, supra note 
128, at 7 (defining “singularity” as “a future period during which the pace of technological change will be so 
rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly transformed”). See generally MURRAY SHANAHAN, 
THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY (2015) (providing an overview of technological singularity). But see 
DOMINGOS, supra note 75, at 286–89 (challenging Kurzweil’s view on singularity). Benjamin Alarie extends 
the concept of technological singularity to the legal field. See Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards 
Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 443 (2016). As he explained: 
The legal singularity contemplates the elimination of legal uncertainty and the emergence of a 
seamless legal order, which is universally accessible in real time. In the legal singularity, disputes 
over the legal significance of agreed facts will be rare. There may be disputes over facts, but, once 
found, the facts will map onto clear legal consequences. The law will be functionally complete. 
Id. at 446. 
189. See Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo, Preface to RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at xxiv, 
xxv–xxvi (“Artificial intelligence will not be ‘content’ to stay within the geographical boundaries of any 
particular jurisdiction, or nation state for that matter, therefore to be effective, the regulatory approach to AI 
will have to be international in scope.”); BRAD SMITH & CAROL ANN BROWNE, TOOLS AND WEAPONS: THE 
PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF THE DIGITAL AGE 300 (2019) (“[T]he inexorable course of technology is 
forcing more international collaboration. . . . [I]ssues like surveillance reform, privacy protection, and 
cybersecurity safeguards have all required governments to deal with each other in new ways.”).  
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with them,190 technologies that are deployed overseas also export values.191 
Langdon Winner rightly reminded us that technological artifacts embody the 
political, social, economic, and other conditions behind the development of 
these artifacts.192 Indeed, as technologies originating from developed and 
emerging countries are being rapidly and widely deployed throughout the world, 
one cannot help but wonder whether such deployment will lead to even greater 
convergence of legal norms, beyond what we have already seen through 
globalization and the efforts of international organizations and multilateral 
agreements.193 
Third, the increasing reliance on machine-based decision-making will have 
a direct impact on the future development of the legal community. In fact, 
commentators have already expressed concern that such reliance, and the 
increased allocation of decision-making power to machines, will undermine the 
effectiveness of that profession.194 As Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi 
Goldfarb observed in the artificial intelligence context, “If the machines get the 
experience, then the humans might not.”195 Growing legal automation could 
therefore lead to the deskilling of the legal profession,196 just like how our ability 
 
190. As Alan Watson observed in his seminal work: “Transplanting frequently, perhaps always, 
involves legal transformation. Even when the transplanted rule remains unchanged, its impact in a new social 
setting may be different. The insertion of an alien rule into another complex system may cause it to operate 
in a fresh way.” ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 116 (2d ed. 
1993); see also Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 24 (1974) (noting 
that, because transplanted laws often bring with them foreign values, they may upset longstanding traditions 
in the recipient countries while at the same time undermining institutions that are “closely linked with the 
structure and organisation of political and social power in their own environment”); Yu, Digital Copyright 
Reform, supra note 31, at 770 (“[If legal transplants] are hastily adopted without careful evaluation and 
adaptation, they may be both ineffective and insensitive to local conditions. They may also stifle local 
development while upsetting the existing local tradition.”). 
191. See LEE, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that “American technology companies . . . were pushing their 
products and their values on users around the globe”); ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL 
AGE: TRANSFORMING NATIONS, BUSINESSES, AND OUR LIVES 111–12 (2013) (“Technology companies 
export their values along with their products . . . .”). 
192. See LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF 
HIGH TECHNOLOGY 19–39 (1986) (noting that technological artifacts can embody specific forms of power 
and authority); see also John Naughton, Here Is the News—but Only if Facebook Thinks You Need to Know, 
GUARDIAN (May 15, 2016, 4:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/15/ 
facebook-instant-articles-news-publishers-feeding-the-beast (“Any algorithm that has to make choices has 
criteria that are specified by its designers. And those criteria are expressions of human values. Engineers may 
think they are ‘neutral’, but long experience has shown us they are babes in the woods of politics, economics 
and ideology.”). 
193. See generally Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 429–35 (2004) (discussing the international harmonization of intellectual property 
standards). 
194. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1096–98 (discussing how the switch from human judges to robot 
judges would weaken the legal community); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 247 (“Increasing use of 
AI will . . . foster lay and even professional alienation from law as adjudication increasingly moves within the 
exclusive dominion of technical specialists.”). 
195. AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 192; see also id. at 193 (“[E]xperience is a scarce resource, some 
of which you need to allocate to humans to avoid deskilling.”). 
196. See id. at 192 (noting the concern that “automation could result in the deskilling of humans”).  
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to use maps will greatly decrease with our increasing reliance on apps or 
software utilizing the Global Positioning System.197 Moreover, the increased use 
of artificial intelligence may reduce the participation of the existing legal 
community. As Richard Re and Alicia Solow-Niederman observed, “As AI 
adjudicators play a larger role in the legal system, human participation will 
change and, in some respects, decrease. Those developments raise the prospect 
of alienation, or the tendency for some or all people to cease participating in 
the legal system and even lose interest in its operations.”198 
B. Legislature 
As far as the interaction between artificial intelligence and the legislative 
process is concerned, commentators have explored three broad sets of 
legislative roles that will help facilitate legal automation. First, the legislature will 
determine what type of decision can be automated. Second, it will provide 
assistance to ensure the successful automation of those decisions, including the 
provision of funding support and the introduction of laws to limit the liability 
for faulty machine-made decisions199 and to prevent security breaches and 
malicious interferences.200 Third, the legislature will provide legal remedies, 
including institutional mechanisms, to address problems that will arise from the 
automation of these decisions.201 To fashion these remedies, both the 
government and the legislature will have important roles to play. 
One area that has received only limited attention concerns the legislature’s 
role in determining what type of algorithms could be deemed suitable for 
automating laws and legal decisions. In a recent article, Professor Elkin-Koren 
suggested that courts should play some role in making this type of decision.202 
As she observed, with the growing use of artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, they may have to “determin[e] acceptable error rates when testing the 
outcome of such a system compared to determination by the court.”203 
While I agree with her on the need for determining acceptable error rates, 
the legislature’s greater fact-finding capacity and its ability to bring in 
technologists for testimonies will likely make the branch superior for making 
 
197. See Joseph Stromberg, Is GPS Ruining Our Ability to Navigate for Ourselves?, VOX (Sept. 2, 2015, 11:31 
AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/2/9242049/gps-maps-navigation (exploring whether the use of the 
Global Positioning System has undermined our navigation skills). 
198. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 275. 
199. See infra note 240 (providing sources examining the legal liability raised by autonomous vehicles). 
200.  See Crootof, supra note 8, at 240 (“Unintended glitches and intended interference from malicious 
actors create other potential sources of error.”); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1171–77 (discussing the potential 
hacking of the artificial intelligence judge programs and the exploitation of unexpected glitches in those 
programs). 
201. See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (2019) (discussing 
the challenges in designing a remedies regime for robots). 
202. Elkin-Koren, supra note 43, at 1099. 
203. Id. 
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this type of determination. If the legislature chooses, it could also create a 
certification process or an institutional mechanism to help determine what type 
of algorithm could be deemed suitable for making those determinations.204 
The development of this process or mechanism is important for two 
reasons. First, such development will be needed to address the likely existence 
of a wide variety of algorithms that could make satisfactory automated fair use 
determinations.205 Indeed, the diverging algorithms that are being developed 
will likely involve different trade-offs, such as “more speed, less accuracy; more 
autonomy, less control; more data, less privacy.”206 Allowing for the existence 
of multiple algorithms will therefore help increase consumer choices while 
promoting competition in algorithmic quality.207 
Second, past experience has shown that for-profit entities are unlikely to 
develop a satisfactory arrangement that is in the best interest of the public. As 
Olivier Sylvain observed: 
The ambition to foster “healthy” online engagement, while more than an 
afterthought, is hardly the Big Tech companies’ main priority. These 
companies are not (and do not see themselves as) chiefly in the business of 
calibrating the right balance between human moderators and screening 
algorithms. Rather, their aim is to hold and expand their dominion over 
networked information flows.208 
 
204. Cf. Susan Saab Fortney, Online Legal Document Providers and the Public Interest: Using a Certification 
Approach to Balance Access to Justice and Public Protection, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 91, 117–22 (2019) (discussing the 
benefits of using certification to enhance consumer protection and to promote competition in the market of 
online providers of automated legal documentation); Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 358 (noting the need to 
“set up a neutral and representative body that would supervise the development of fair use algorithms” and 
a process for certifying algorithms “that are . . . capable of making high-quality decisions”). 
205. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 5 (“There is often no single right answer to the question 
of which is the best AI strategy or the best set of AI tools . . . .”). 
206. Id.; see also PAUL R. DAUGHERTY & H. JAMES WILSON, HUMAN + MACHINE: REIMAGINING 
WORK IN THE AGE OF AI 126 (2018) (“A deep-learning system . . . provides a high level of prediction 
accuracy, but companies may have difficulty explaining how those results were derived. In contrast, a decision 
tree may not lead to results with high prediction accuracy but will enable a significantly greater 
explainability.”). 
207. As I noted in a recent article: 
Competition is imperative if society is to develop more efficient, more effective, and less biased 
algorithms. Such competition is particularly needed when algorithmic choices are increasingly 
difficult, or time consuming, to explain. Indeed, without competition, it would be hard to identify 
problems within an algorithm or to determine whether that algorithm has provided the best 
solution in light of the existing technological conditions and constraints. 
Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra note 69, at 382–83 (footnotes omitted); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right 
and the Protection of Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 927 (2019) (noting that competition law is “a 
critical area relating to data governance”); Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the 
CFAA: The Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1307, 1310 
(2018) (“Online competitors . . . promote fair online practices by providing users with a choice between 
competitive products . . . .”). 
208. Sylvain, supra note 166, at 264; see also Kroll et al., supra note 98, at 682 (“A prejudiced 
decisionmaker could skew the training data or pick proxies for protected classes with the intent of generating 
discriminatory results.”). 
8CE27804-BB25-428A-BE50-16224798167C.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  9:21 PM 
2020] Artificial Intelligence, the Law–Machine Interface, and Fair Use Automation 231 
 If the legislature goes the certification route, it will have to take its role 
seriously, lest it allow justice to be privatized.209 To protect the public, Richard 
Re and Alicia Solow-Niederman proposed to “remove profit-seeking actors 
from the market for jurisprudential tools” while calling on the government to 
“produce a ‘public option’ jurisprudential tool for key purposes, such as 
criminal justice.”210 In earlier articles, I also noted the need to “set up a neutral 
and representative body that would supervise the development of fair use 
algorithms.”211 The creation of this neutral and representative body will be of 
critical importance if we are to prevent industry lobbies and interest groups 
from capturing the algorithm design process the same way they would capture 
the legislative process.212 
C. Bench 
When artificial intelligence is mentioned alongside judges, an oft-raised 
question concerns whether we are now ready for machine-generated decisions. 
In a recent article, Eugene Volokh advanced a highly provocative thought 
experiment concerning society’s readiness for robot judges.213 His thought 
experiment went as follows: if an automated system can generate a set of 
opinions as persuasive as those written by an average human judge in an 
opinion-writing competition, and if that system can be adequately protected 
from hacking or other vulnerabilities, that system should be deemed to be “an 
adequate substitute for humans.”214 
 
209. See generally Eldar Haber, Privatization of the Judiciary, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 115 (2016) (highlighting 
the danger of privatization of the judiciary to democratic society). 
210. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 285. 
211. Yu, Fair Use, supra note 18, at 358; accord Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 
43, at 68 (“[W]e need to develop a process that brings together copyright holders, technology developers, 
consumer advocates, civil libertarians and other stakeholders.”); see also IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. 
MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 177 (2013) (“[G]reater multistakeholder involvement will improve the quality of regulatory design, 
including the technical understanding of code.”); COHEN, supra note 47, at 192 (“Mastering the processes by 
which technical standards are developed . . . requires . . . new public accountability mechanisms.”); SMITH & 
BROWNE, supra note 189, at 208 (“[A] global conversation about ethical principles for artificial intelligence 
will require . . . seats at the table not only for technologists, governments, NGOs, and educators, but for 
philosophers and representatives of the world’s many religions.”). 
212. See sources cited supra note 58. 
213. Volokh, supra note 8. 
214. Id. at 1138–39. Specifically, Professor Volokh utilized what he described as the “Modified John 
Henry Test,” which runs as follows: 
The way to practically evaluate results is the Modified John Henry Test, a competition in which a 
computer program is arrayed against, say, ten average performers in some field—medical 
diagnosis, translation, or what have you. All the performers would then be asked to execute, say, 
ten different tasks—for instance, the translation of ten different passages. 
 Sometimes this performance can be measured objectively. Often, it can’t be, so we would need 
a panel of, say, ten human judges who are known to be experts in the subject—for example, 
experienced doctors or fluent speakers of the two languages involved in a translation. Those 
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The aspiration of having robot judges is nothing new. In fact, the literature 
on the application of artificial intelligence to the law dates back to as early as 
the 1970s.215 While the artificial intelligence we have today is very different from 
what we had at that time—with the latter featuring mostly mainframes, much 
more limited processing power, and no big data analytics216—many of the legal 
and ethical questions have remained the same. 
Thus far, commentators have widely debated over whether robots should 
be allowed to take the role of judges.217 Even if one agrees with Professor 
Volokh that robots can eventually succeed in judicial roles and is willing to 
ignore the fact that our state of technology is still quite far away from that very 
scenario, judges will still be in a good position to contribute to the better 
development of the law–machine interface. First, judges can determine what 
type of technology can be satisfactorily deployed to assist with the adjudication 
process. As Part II.B has noted, machines can perform certain tasks better than 
humans. Allowing machines to focus on those specific tasks will provide what 
commentators have referred to as “intelligence augmentation.”218 Such 
augmentation will free the judges “to focus on more complex legal 
questions,”219 although commentators continue to debate the desirability of 
hybrid decision-making.220 
 
judges should evaluate everyone’s performance without knowing which participant is a computer 
and which is human. 
 If the computer performs at least as well as the average performer, then the computer passes 
the Modified John Henry Test. We can call it “intelligent” enough in its field. Or, more to the 
point, we can say that it is an adequate substitute for humans. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
215. For this literature, see generally Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation About 
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1970); Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers 
Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977); L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in 
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977). The literature cited here was collected in 
Volokh, supra note 8, at 1137 n.3. 
216. See John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 40, 42–45 
(discussing the evolution of artificial intelligence in the past few decades). 
217. On this debate, see generally Crootof, supra note 8; Michaels, supra note 8; Re & Solow-Niederman, 
supra note 8; Volokh, supra note 8; Wu, supra note 8. 
218. See Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, supra note 8, at 54 (calling on the legal profession to pursue “a 
complementary vision of human-machine cooperation” and to focus more on intelligence augmentation); 
Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 
8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 612 (2002) (“‘[I]ntelligence augmentation’ allows the effects of automatization 
to creep up the skill chain, providing for the substitution of white collar jobs by machines and allowing people 
with less formal training and education to perform more sophisticated tasks.”); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1147–
52 (discussing the “AI Associate” and “AI Staff Attorney” models); Albert H. Yoon, The Post-Modern Lawyer: 
Technology and the Democratization of Legal Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 466 (2016) (“Intelligence 
augmentation . . . reflects a symbiotic relationship between humans and technology. Humans continue to 
perform the task at hand, but they do so interactively with technology in order to do it better.”). 
219. Yoon, supra note 218, at 468. 
220. While the combined use of human and machine-made decisions has become increasingly common 
and can generate more desirable outcomes, such hybrid decision-making can also generate outcomes that are 
less desirable than those made solely by either humans or machines. See sources cited supra note 13. 
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Second, judges can determine how much of the decision-making power 
should be given to machines,221 especially in so-called hard cases.222 Even if 
society prefers to have lawmakers decide the proper allocation of 
decision-making power between humans and machines, the legislature could 
still leave some discretion to judges to fine-tune this allocation based on 
professional experiences and specific circumstances. Because fair use cases 
involve case-by-case balancing, judges will find it helpful to retain some ability 
to fine-tune such allocation. 
Third, judges will have additional opportunities to influence the 
development of the law–machine interface. In addition to making individual 
case-by-case adjustments, they could exert influence as part of an epistemic 
community.223 Indeed, because many jurisdictions are now grappling with 
questions on the interplay of artificial intelligence and the law, there is an urgent 
need for an active cross-jurisdictional judicial dialogue. Such a dialogue will not 
only help achieve consensus at the national, regional, or international level, but 
will also enhance the judges’ ability to anticipate and address unforeseen 
challenges in this area. 
Finally, judges can share their views with legislators and technologists. With 
respect to the former, they can weigh in on the key algorithmic design questions 
discussed in Part III, such as the allocation of decision-making power, the 
 
221. As Richard Re and Alicia Solow-Niederman suggested: 
[One] form of human/machine division of labor would apportion discrete types of judicial 
decision-making to human as opposed to mechanized actors. The resulting separation could be 
based on subject matter, such as a rule barring automated judging in criminal cases. Or it could 
derive from more fine-grained determinations about which parts of a legal decision raise concerns 
about equitable and codified justice. For example, some types of fact-finding could be well-suited 
for mechanization, without a commensurate cost in disillusionment and alienation, so long as 
there is a human judge who engages in the analytically severable task of applying the facts to the 
law. Even within appellate courts, a split in judicial function between human rule-generation and 
mechanized rule-application might be desirable. More broadly, codified justice already marks key 
aspects of many bureaucratic legal systems, and AI adjudicators might simply offer a better 
version of codified justice, limited to those contexts. 
Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 8, at 283 (footnotes omitted). 
222. As Professor Wu observed: 
[One] benefit of human courts over software is their advantages in hard cases, and the prevention 
of absurd errors, obviously unjust results, and other inequitable consequences of a blind 
adherence to rules. There are, on closer examination, several ways in which a case can be “hard.” 
Some cases might be hard only because the software lacks the ability to understand context or 
nuance, as in understanding that “I’m going to kill my husband” may be a figurative statement, 
not a death threat. And, others may be hard in the jurisprudential sense because they require the 
balancing of conflicting values or avoidance of absurd consequence. Finally, it may be that the 
stakes just seem large enough to merit human involvement, as in the decision to sentence 
someone to death. 
Wu, supra note 8, at 2023. 
223. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004) (discussing the 
interactions of judges in a transnational network); see also MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: 
GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (1998) (noting that epistemic 
communities “are valuable for their enormous pools of information and their capacities to acquire and 
generate more”). 
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hierarchy of decisions, and the legal effects of machine-made decisions.224 With 
respect to the latter, judges can educate technologists on how they make 
decisions and how to think like a lawyer.225 To the extent that we want to 
preserve the existing judicial system and to avoid undue disruption by machines, 
learning how judges make decisions will remain highly important. Such 
knowledge will be even more important when society has chosen the translation 
pathway over the other pathways to facilitate legal automation. 
D. Bar 
Similar to the question about judges, many commentators have questioned 
our readiness for robot lawyers,226 including prosecutors, defenders, and 
associates.227 Obviously, many questions still remain, ranging from the capacity 
of intelligent machines to provide legal advice228 to their ability to effectively 
handle ethical challenges.229 Instead of rehashing the answers to these 
questions, this Subpart turns to a new area that has not received sufficient policy 
and scholarly attention: the need for new legal personnel to play roles that did 
not exist before the age of artificial intelligence. 
 
224. See discussion supra Part III. 
225. See sources cited supra note 112. 
226. See sources cited supra note 8. 
227. See generally Kristen Thomasen, Examining the Constitutionality of Robot-enhanced Interrogation, in ROBOT 
LAW, supra note 16, at 306 (discussing how robot interrogators may engage the fundamental constitutional 
rights to privacy and silence); Volokh, supra note 8, at 1147–52 (discussing artificial intelligence-driven 
associates and staff attorneys). 
228. As my colleague Milan Markovic aptly observed: 
Regardless of their level of sophistication, clients often do not have clear objectives and require 
assistance in shaping them. Clients also sometimes misunderstand the legal system and do not 
view their situations, including any wrongs they may have suffered, in legalistic terms. A fully 
autonomous, composed, and decided client may not require the counseling of an attorney, but 
that is not the messy reality of the law as lived. 
. . . . 
 [Moreover, a]n intelligent machine may be able to determine if a course of conduct is unlawful; 
it may also be able to calculate the probability that any misconduct will be detected. What it cannot 
do is fulfill the other crucial “half” of a lawyer’s role: shaming and persuading clients and would -be 
clients “that they are damned fools and should stop.” As David Luban has explained, intelligent  
machines lack emotional intelligence and moral authority and cannot buttress legal and non-legal 
considerations to exhort clients to act in accordance with the law. 
Markovic, supra note 8, at 344–46 (footnotes omitted). 
229. See Drew McDermott, Why Ethics Is a High Hurdle for AI 2 (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/dvm/papers/ethical-machine.pdf (“[E]thical behavior is an extremely 
difficult area to automate, both because it requires ‘solving all of AI’ and because even that might not be 
sufficient.”); see also DOMINGOS, supra note 75, at 280 (“[L]etting robots learn ethics by observing humans 
may not be such a good idea. The robot is liable to get seriously confused when it sees that humans’ actions 
often violate their ethical principles.”). 
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In their widely cited book on big data, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and 
Kenneth Cukier discussed the future need for algorithmists.230 As they 
explained: 
These new professionals would be experts in the areas of computer science, 
mathematics, and statistics; they would act as reviewers of big-data analyses 
and predictions. Algorithmists would take a vow of impartiality and 
confidentiality, much as accountants and certain other professionals do now. 
They would evaluate the selection of data sources, the choice of analytical and 
predictive tools, including algorithms and models, and the interpretation of 
results. In the event of a dispute, they would have access to the algorithms, 
statistical approaches, and datasets that produced a given decision.231 
Applying these insights to the present context, one cannot help but wonder 
whether two new types of legal professionals will emerge: algorithmically 
oriented lawyers and legal algorithmists. 
Given the important and ever-growing roles of intelligent machines in the 
legal process and the growing importance of addressing issues at the law–
machine interface, we will need to have lawyers that have a good grasp of 
artificial intelligence and what the latest technology can and cannot do.232 The 
importance of algorithmic literacy233 has caused commentators and educators 
to emphasize the importance of computational thinking.234 In the future, those 
 
230. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 180–82 (2013) (discussing the need for external and 
internal algorithmists). 
231. Id. at 180. 
232. See Crootof, supra note 8, at 244 (“If we wish to elicit the benefits of human reasoning, teaming 
systems must be designed so that the human in the loop understands the AI program’s capabi lities and 
limitations, has reason to exercise valued human skills, and is actively engaged in the decisionmaking process.” 
(footnote omitted)); Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1939 
(2019) (“[T]here is a parallel duty for technology providers to have some basic understanding of the law as 
they serve their clients.”). 
233. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 80, at 142 (“Improving digital literacy of citizens 
should be a high priority for the government and other organizations.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 
72, at 74–76 (surveying views on the need for algorithmic literacy); U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. 
[UNESCO], ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN EDUCATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6–7 (2019) (stating that “teachers must learn new digital skills to use AI in a 
pedagogical and meaningful way”); U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. [USAID], REFLECTING THE PAST, 
SHAPING THE FUTURE: MAKING AI WORK FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 74 (2018) 
(“Strengthening training programs for data science and machine learning in local development contexts can 
help create a pipeline of individuals who are ‘bilingual’ in the sense of understanding local context and having 
the technical skills to take an active role in developing [machine learning] tools.”); Yu, Algorithmic Divide, supra 
note 69, at 362–65 (discussing the need to increase algorithmic literacy). 
234. The International Society for Technology in Education and the Computer Science Teachers 
Association provided the following operational definition of computational thinking: 
Computational thinking (CT) is a problem-solving process that includes (but is not limited to) the 
following characteristics: 
• Formulating problems in a way that enables us to use a computer and other tools to help solve  
them[] 
• Logically organizing and analyzing data 
• Representing data through abstractions such as models and simulations 
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lawyers who are equipped with a better understanding of the technological 
aspects of the legal decision-making process will likely be in better positions to 
serve their clients than those who do not or who rely solely, or mostly, on 
technology experts to provide gap-filling advice. The need for algorithmically 
oriented lawyers therefore arises. 
The flip side is also true. Just as society needs to have algorithmically 
oriented lawyers, it also needs to have legal algorithmists. While internal 
algorithmists conduct audits inside the developers of automated systems,235 
external algorithmists undertake evaluation from the outside and fulfill roles 
designated by the legislature or regulatory authorities.236 These algorithmists are 
legal algorithmists because they have a specialized focus on legal technology 
and on other technologies that have serious ramifications for the legal system. 
E. Academe 
As far as academic research is concerned, there is no shortage of materials 
on artificial intelligence and the law.237 In fact, law schools and legal 
 
• Automating solutions through algorithmic thinking (a series of ordered steps) 
• Identifying, analyzing, and implementing possible solutions with the goal of achieving the most 
efficient and effective combination of steps and resources 
• Generalizing and transferring this problem solving process to a wide variety of problems 
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want expert support. And they may certify the soundness of big-data applications like anti-fraud 
techniques or stock-trading systems. Finally, external algorithmists are prepared to consult with 
government agencies on how best to use big data in the public sector.  
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commentators have been actively organizing symposia and book projects to 
address questions arising at the intersection of artificial intelligence and the 
law.238 
While many questions have been explored in regard to whether artificial 
intelligence will change the outcome of legal analysis—such as whether works 
created by artificial intelligence are eligible for copyright or patent protection239 
or whether accidents caused by autonomous vehicles deserve the same type of 
legal liability240—it is time that academics explored whether some of these 
questions will have to be asked differently. 
In the example concerning the development of automated fair use systems, 
the previous discussion has shown different pathways for legal automation: 
translation, approximation, and self-determination.241 At the moment, we do 
not have enough evidence—empirical or otherwise—to inform whether one 
pathway will promote creativity better than the others. We also do not have 
sufficient research concerning the law–machine interface or how to facilitate a 
more optimal division of labor between humans and machines in the legal 
system.242 Considering that the future of this system may be quite different from 
what we have today, it may be wise to start anticipating these potentially 
transformative changes and exploring what this process will become. 
In addition to new thinking and research, academe needs to evaluate 
existing curricula and pedagogies to determine whether they are equipped to 
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train the next generation of lawyers.243 As the previous Subpart has noted, the 
need for algorithmically oriented lawyers will only continue to grow, and those 
lawyers who have high algorithmic literacy will be in better positions to help 
clients than those who do not.244 By introducing up-to-date curricula and 
pedagogies, law schools and other legal education providers will be able to train 
lawyers to take full advantage of the growing deployment of automated systems 
and artificial intelligence technologies in the legal field while at the same time 
responding effectively to the changes and challenges posed by these new 
technologies. 
CONCLUSION 
The age of artificial intelligence has brought to the legal field many thorny 
and complex questions. While some of them resemble questions that we are 
already asking in the legal discipline, or are extensions of those questions, others 
are novel and will require new legal, technological, or techno-legal insights.245 
By utilizing the case study of fair use automation, this Article calls for greater 
attention not only to the impact of artificial intelligence on the law but also to 
the law–machine interface. If the impact of artificial intelligence in other areas 
of society is any guide,246 the technological advances in this area will likely 
precipitate profound changes to the legal system. The sooner we start thinking 
about these changes, the quicker we can harness these technological advances 
to improve the law, legal institutions, and the legal process, and the better off 
society will be. 
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